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ABSTRACT
Cash, Credit, or Cell Phone? How to Influence Public Preferences About
Payment Systems examines how the government can influence the public’s choice of a
particular payment system: not only existing systems like credit and debit cards, but
innovative products such as stored value cards, electronic checks and electronic money.
The success or failure of a new payment system can have a large economic impact, with
shifts toward electronic payment options in particular having the potential to save up to
one percent of a nation’s gross domestic product. For the United States, that translates to
approximately one hundred billion dollars worth of savings.
Whether a new payment system succeeds or fails depends upon social acceptance;
that is, consumers and merchants have to simultaneously embrace the new payment
option. Government action, both direct and indirect, can strongly influence consumer
and merchant behavior. Whether and how the government affects payment preferences
depends on whether the government is acting as fiduciary, seller, or law-maker; its
precise goal; and the particular sort of payment system at issue. Depending on the
situation, the government may (1) provide information that allows individuals to
coordinate behavior, (2) pass legislation or adopt policies aimed at reducing concerns
about a particular system, (3) provide incentives to induce individuals to adopt new
payment systems, or (4) force change by eliminating or curtailing the older payment
form. Cash, Credit or Cell Phone? suggests that in the realm of payments, governmental
efforts to influence behavior will be most successful if they force change, not if they
gently influence public preferences. This conclusion runs counter to the common
wisdom in the social norms literature that law most effectively influences behavior when
it promotes incremental advancement, not wholesale change.
Because payment methods are poised to continue the massive evolution that has
occurred over the past twenty-five years, advocates of new systems are increasingly
likely to attempt to involve government in promoting their fledging payment
mechanisms. Cash, Credit or Cell Phone? suggests that government intervention,
although often successful, is usually unwise for at least three reasons. First, technology
moves quickly and the government usually moves slowly. Second, with a bit of time,
new payment systems that are sufficiently advantageous to the public are likely to
flourish without governmental intervention. Third and finally, governmental intervention
may have the unintended consequence of undermining the incentive to invest in new
payment technologies in the first instance.
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Introduction
Open your wallets. Many of you have a couple of credits cards, an ATM or debit
card and, if you live in a metropolitan area with a large transit system, a stored value card
that you use to pay the transit fare. You probably have some cash as well, maybe a few
singles, a couple of fives, and a twenty. What you almost certainly do not have is a twodollar bill, even though Congress made the bill legal tender as far back as 1862.2
While most of us are familiar only with the two-dollar bill issued in 1976, the
denomination actually has a long history in this country, one that is best summarized as a
“flop.” The bill has been extraordinarily unpopular since its beginning. In 1862, the bill
featured a portrait of Alexander Hamilton, the Treasury Secretary who was killed in a
duel by Aaron Burr. Remarkably, the story that the bill was “bad luck” quickly took
hold. In 1869, the Treasury replaced Hamilton’s picture with one of Jefferson, but most
Americans still refused to use the bill, or, if they did, they tore the corner off in a practice
that was said to break the “curse.”3 In 1966, the Treasury cited “a lack of public interest”
and formally discontinued the bill.4 At that time, two-dollar bills accounted for less than
one-third of one percent of all circulating currency. Two-dollar bills were used so
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infrequently that their average life was six years, compared to 18 months for a one dollar
bill.5
In 1976, ten years after the government discontinued the bill, efficiency concerns
prompted the Treasury to bring it back. The Treasury argued that, by replacing about
half of the one-dollar bills with the equivalent dollar amount of two-dollar bills, it would
save between four and seven million dollars each year (in 1976 dollars).6 The Treasury
further suggested that individuals would experience efficiency gains as well. Rising
inflation meant that one-dollar bills purchased less and less, and a two-dollar bill was
expected to facilitate cash transactions and decrease business operating costs by reducing
the number of bills that retailers and banks handled.7 Although the bill was issued in
1976 and featured the signing of the Declaration of Independence, the Treasury stressed
that the reissue “was not intended as simply a commemorative act for this year, but rather
signifies the permanent addition of another U.S. denomination.” The Treasury further
emphasized that it was printing a large number of the bills, so that enough would be
available for widespread use.8
The new two-dollar bill was so poorly received, however, that by 1982, Federal
Reserve banks still had about half of the original bills in their vaults, awaiting circulation.
Nothing captures the failure of the bill more aptly than the Treasury website itself. The
website lists “Why is the $2 bill no longer in circulation?” as one of the most frequently
asked questions. The Treasury responds by noting that, contrary to popular belief, the
bill still circulates, but:
The key for successfully circulating the two-dollar bill is for retailers to use
them just like any other denomination in their daily operations. In addition,
most commercial banks will readily supply their retail customers with these
bills if their customers request them in sufficient volume to justify stocking
them in their vaults. However, neither the Treasury Department nor the
Federal Reserve System can force the distribution or use of any
denomination of currency on banks, businesses, or individuals.9
The success of the two-dollar bill depends, in other words, on whether individuals choose
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to use the bill in the first instance. Over the past thirty years, they have refused to.
In retrospect, the Treasury’s concern with the loss of purchasing power for the
one-dollar bill and the efficiency gain from switching to the two-dollar bill seem quaint.
The past thirty years have seen a major shift in the ways consumers pay for their
purchases, both large and small, and these changes have vastly decreased the need for a
switch to the two-dollar bill. Through the 1970s, checks and cash dominated the world of
payments. Since that time, though, financial institutions have introduced numerous
alternative payment schemes, such as credit cards, debit cards, electronic money,
electronic checks, and automated clearing house transactions, all of which have lessened
the need for cash and checks.
In coming years, we are likely to see increased marketing of new electronic
payment products. Since the 1990s, banks and other payment service providers have
been trotting out (with varying success) new payment products such as stored value
cards, payroll cards, electronic checks, electronic money, and the electronic truncation of
checks. During the remainder of this decade, we are likely to see the use of even more
sophisticated payment systems that function through cell phones or through small
electronic transmitters found on our keychains. Many of these products are already in
widespread use in foreign countries. Indeed, some payments providers have already
begun to discuss the possibility of payment using biometric devices that would identify
payers through their fingerprints or other physical characteristics. The open question is
whether, like credit cards and debit cards, these new payment methods will go into
widespread use in the United States or whether they will suffer the fate of the two-dollar
bill.
The success or failure of each of these payment systems has a potentially large
economic impact. One recent study concluded that the move to electronic payment
systems can save up to 1% of a country’s GDP.10 Success or failure, though, depends not
just on economics but upon social acceptance. For instance, the recent growth in the
usage of debit cards has been directly linked to consumers= willingness to not merely use
debit cards to withdraw cash from bank accounts but to make actual purchases with the
10
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cards, something unheard of just ten years ago.11 Similarly, the relatively spectacular
failure of electronic money “stored value cards” in an experiment on the Upper West Side
of Manhattan in the late 1990s is a striking reminder that any payment system, no matter
how technologically savvy, will fail without customer support.12 Even money itself is
defined in social terms, as “any generally acceptable means of payment in exchange for
goods and services and in settling debts.”13
This article is about how the government and financial institutions can influence
the public’s choice of a particular payment system. Governmental action, both indirect
and direct, affects what is “generally acceptable,” that is, what forms of payment
merchants will accept and consumers will use. As an example of indirect intervention,
extensive legislation and regulation supports the checking system; Articles 3 and 4 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, along with an array of federal laws and regulations, set the
basic terms for most check transactions, while the Federal Reserve itself has long acted as
a cornerstone in the process of check collection. In an indirect fashion, these kinds of
government actions make a particular payment system more attractive. After all, if
checks were more difficult to exchange, people would be less inclined to use them.
Government support for the implementation of, or the infrastructure for, a particular
payment system generally shifts consumer choices toward that system.
The government also “speaks” explicitly to the public in an effort to influence its
preference for a particular payment system. For instance, through section 5103 of Title
31, the federal government speaks to the public about what we think of as “money”—
pennies, nickels, dimes, quarters, and various denominations of federal reserve notes.
The title provides that AUnited States coins and currency ... are legal tender for all debts,
public charges, taxes, and dues.@14 As a result, all private and public creditors are
11
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required to accept federal currency in payment of debts, subject to a limitation of
reasonableness for the time and means of payment.15 As another example, a state transit
authority may give preferential treatment to customers who use electronic payment, such
as Metrocard or E-Z Pass.16 Or, as a third example, Congress may pass statutes that
alleviate consumer concerns about the risk of credit card fraud. In all of these instances,
government attempts to influence preferences about particular forms of payment.
When it comes to emerging payment systems, the federal government has already
begun to attempt to shape consumer choices. Just two years ago, Congress passed Check
21, which aimed to modernize our checking system by eliminating the journey that
checks make by ground and air after they are written by the payor.17 Check 21
streamlines check processing by requiring all banks and consumers to accept electronic
substitutes for the original check. It seeks to alter consumer preferences in two different
ways. First, as with the legal tender statute, Check 21 overrides consumer preferences:
even if a bank or consumer would prefer to receive the original check, they cannot insist
upon it.18 Second, Check 21 requires that electronic substitute checks contain the legend,
“This a legal copy of your check. You can use it the same way you would use the
original check.”19 By educating the public that substitute checks have exactly the same
legal force as the original checks they replace, the legend speaks directly to consumers.
Check 21 is likely only the tip of the legislative iceberg. As providers of payment
systems invest large amounts of capital in new technologies, they will continue to ask the
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government to help ensure that the technology is a hit with the general public.
In recent years, of course, much literature has discussed satisfaction and
maximization of preferences. Most of this discussion falls well outside the scope of this
paper. For our present purposes, we accept that preferences are malleable and examine
the extent to which it is appropriate and possible for the government to influence public
acceptance and use of new payment systems. We begin in Part I by describing in some
detail the payment options that we discuss throughout the article. Part II models how
merchants and consumers decide whether to adopt and use a particular payment form,
and then introduces the complications of network effects and multi-sided platforms. In
Part III, we briefly describe how, when it comes to payments systems, government may
assume the roles of legislator, fiduciary, or seller. Part IV then describes the tools that
government has available to influence consumer preferences. The Part discusses why
steamrolling over consumer preferences is less risky in the world of payments than in
other contexts. We argue that, in order for new payment forms to flourish, the
government often has to force the public’s hand by eliminating competing payment
alternatives. Finally, Part V explores where the payment industry is headed over the next
decade, predicts what actions the industry might call upon Congress to take, and cautions
that, notwithstanding our analysis in Part IV, such governmental intervention will often
be unwise.
Part I. Payment Options Defined
We begin by defining a few key terms. Throughout this paper, we will sometimes
refer to charge cards, rather than credit cards. The term charge card means any card that
permits the cardholder to make a payment using the card, with the amount charged to a
third party, who then collects the funds from the cardholder. Credit cards, as we use the
term, refer to a subset of charge cards in which the third party permits the cardholder to
defer payment of the funds and instead allows the cardholder to finance the charge
through a revolving line of credit.20 This understanding of the relationship between
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charge cards and credit cards accords with the historical development of such cards:
charge cards, such as the Diners Club, American Express, and Carte Blanche cards, first
arose in the 1950s as a way for (primarily) business travelers to make payments of
lodging, food, and entertainment expenses without carrying cash.21 Credit cards, as a
subset of charge cards, arose a decade later with the introduction of the BankAmericard
(later, the Visa card). As we will explore in more detail below, the availability of this
line of credit helps to explain much of the spread of credit cards in the past few decades.22
A payment device related to the charge card is the debit card. Like charge cards,
debit cards permit the cardholder to make a payment to a merchant through a third-party.
The important differences between charge cards and debit cards are that: (1) in the case
of debit cards, the payment of funds to the merchant comes from a specified deposit
account and (2) that the cardholder takes no further action in order to debit the funds from
the account. In other words, once a consumer initiates a debit card transaction, the
consumer (generally) loses the ability to refuse to pay the funds; instead the funds are
quickly debited from the deposit account. In the case of all charge cards, in contrast, the
cardholder continues to have the practical ability not to make payment to the card-issuer.
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Debit cards themselves are simply an extension of ATM cards, which were first
introduced in the early 1970s.23 The first use of such cards to make retail purchases was
in 1976, but consumers did not begin to take advantage of the debit function in
widespread fashion until the 1990s.24 While most readers are familiar with the basic
outlines of how such cards operate,25 there are important differences between the two
main types of debit cards. Online debit card transactions are processed through an ATM
network, the same one that is used to obtain cash from an ATM machine.26 Just like the
ATM withdrawals with which we are all familiar, such transactions are usually initiated
by swiping the debit card and then entering a personal identification number (“PIN”).27
Offline debit cards differ in that the transfer of funds is not accomplished through an
ATM network, but instead through a credit card network, and generally requires only a
signature, not the entry of a PIN. The Visa Check Card is an example of this sort of
offline debit card.28
Stored value cards are products that have emerged over the last decade but have
not yet gained wide acceptance. Such cards involve the transfer of funds from a funding
source to an electronic recording device on the card. The sources of funds for such cards
are quite heterogeneous: they can be funded by placing cash in a machine that then
transfers the funds to the recording device, through the direct debit of funds from a
deposit account, or even by a transaction charged to a credit card. Perhaps the most
successful examples of such cards are the Metrocard used on the New York City subway
and bus lines and the SmarTrip farecard used on the Washington, D.C. Metrobus and
Metrorail systems. Both the SmarTrip card and the Metrocard are examples of closedsystem cards, which means that they can (generally) only be used to make payments to
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the entity that has issued the card.29 As we will discuss in more detail below, trials of
open-system stored value cards in the United States have usually failed.
Often linked to stored value cards, but conceptually distinct, are so-called smart
cards. This term is generally used to refer to any payment card that has a microchip
embedded in the card that contains information. In Europe, one of the primary uses of
smart card technology has been to allow the embedding of a PIN on a microchip located
on a credit card, which the consumer confirms when she makes a purchase with the
card.30 The use of this anti-fraud technology has not caught on in the United States,
perhaps because the telecommunications network is a cheaper and more reliable means of
validating credit card purchases.31 Instead, American companies have sought to use the
improved security that comes from a smart card to make stored value cards more reliable.
Part II. Merchant and Consumer Preferences
With these key terms defined, this Part turns to a discussion of merchant and
consumer decision-making. Understanding our central inquiry—whether and how the
government should attempt to alter the choices that consumers make about payment
systems—first requires an understanding of how consumers are likely to make such
choices. The decision between payment systems occurs in two stages. In the first stage,
the consumer must choose to adopt a payment system as an option, as must the merchant.
In the second stage, the consumer must decide which of the available payment systems to
use.32
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A. Merchant Decision-Making
For ease of exposition, we start with the merchant’s decision to accept a particular
payment option. For a merchant, the question is whether accepting a payment option will
maximize profits.33 We hypothesize that the merchant will choose to adopt a payment
system when it allows the merchant to maximize its return on its investment. In the
context of payments, this means that the merchant’s investment in a new payment system
must exceed the return on other opportunities.
The profit, P, that a merchant will make from the adoption of any particular
payment system, X, is a function of both the additional revenues that the system will
generate, AR, and the costs of the new system, C:34
P(X) = AR – C .35

(1)

Costs of a payment system can be further subdivided into two types: start-up costs, SC,
such as the initial fees to buy credit card processing terminals, and per transaction costs,
TC,36 such as the cost of a phone call by an employee to verify a credit card, which leads
to the following profit function:
P(X) = AR – SC – TC.

(2)
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The merchant should adopt a particular new payment system over an alternative use, Y,
when:
P(X) > P(Y).

(3)

Because we are discussing alternative uses of the same investments, we can
assume for our present purposes that C(X) = C(Y). This means that a merchant should
adopt a new payment system when the additional revenues from the new payment system
will exceed the additional revenues that would have been generated by an alternative use
of the investment:
AR(X) > AR(Y).

(4)

As an example, consider the case of a restaurant that has to choose between spending
$100 on additional advertising or on adopting a credit card system, which will impose a
3% charge on credit card purchases.37 Assume that the availability of credit cards will
increase the restaurant’s business by $1000 and that the alternative investment in
advertising will generate $950 in business.38 Finally, assume that the marginal cost of
producing the additional food is zero. On this account, the restaurant should invest in the
credit card system because the additional revenues from that system exceed the additional
revenues from advertising, even after we account for the 3% fee paid to the credit card
company.39
Of course, the quantity of both the start-up and per transaction costs will still
matter to the merchant’s decision on whether to adopt a payment system. That is because
37

We will treat the 3% fee as a discount on revenue rather than as an additional cost because the merchant
never expends the fee; it is just a reduction in the payments the merchant receives from the credit card
company.
Note that in the real world, this percentage is too high, at least for a merchant dealing with
transactions involving the presence of the actual credit card (known as “card-present” transactions).
Ronald Mann estimates that the fees for “high-quality retail merchants” are typically 1.5 to 2%. Mann,
Credit Card Policy, supra note 21, at 44.
38
The claim here is just that for a particular merchant, adding a credit card option might increase sales, not
that credit cards or any other payments system increases the number of total sales, which is a different
question. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Framing Hypothesis: Is It Supported By Credit Card Issuers
Opposition to a Surcharge on a Cash Price?, 6 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 217, 223 (1990).
39
That is because AR(X) = $1000 - $30 = $970, which is obviously greater than $950.

11

the larger those costs, the greater the additional revenues have to be in order to justify an
investment in a payment system. If the start-up cost for our restaurant to adopt the new
system was $200, instead of $100, and if $200 in additional advertising would generate
$1500 in additional revenue, then it would be quite clear that the restaurant should invest
in advertisement rather than a payment system.
In the real world, however, we believe that for many merchants the start-up costs
for a new payment system are relatively small, and that therefore the additional revenue
that has to be generated is also relatively small. For instance, a merchant who elects to
start accepting charge cards has to pay almost nothing to buy the technology.40 Most of
the costs for charge card acceptance consist of monthly maintenance and rental fees,
which we categorize as per transaction costs.41 Thus, for merchants interested in a new
payment system, the question is really whether the additional revenues of the new
payment system, minus the per transaction costs, exceed the alternative profits that could
have been generated by those same costs.
There are two final caveats we should mention. First, in many cases, a new
payment system will not increase revenues to the same extent that it might initially
appear. Returning again to our restaurant example, while the restaurant may generate an
additional $1000 in business, it may also be that all of its consumers begin paying using
credit cards. If so, the actual amount of additional revenue is only $820, and the
restaurant should instead spend the money on advertising, which would generate $950 in
revenue.
Second, and more importantly, we need to emphasize that not all of the costs and
(perhaps) not all of the “revenue” may be financial or even quantifiable. For example,
one such potential non-financial cost is the hassle cost associated with adopting and using
a payment system.42 Merchants have to account for the time and effort that their
40

Professor Ronald Mann estimates that the equipment costs are at most a few hundred dollars. See Mann,
Credit Card Policy, supra note 21, at 27.
41
There are also, of course, the per-transaction fees, but as we noted above, see supra note XX, we view
these as a discount on additional revenues, rather than as a cost.
42
See Dan Ariely & Jose Silva, The Macro-Effects of Micro-Pricing: Behavioral Effects of Payment
Methods and the Effectiveness of Micro-Pricing, Working Paper, Mar. 30, 2005 (noting the existence of
hassle). Hassle costs, as we are using the term, are similar to, but not the same as switching costs. See e.g.,
CARL SHAPIRO & HAL VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES 104 (1999). We are assuming here that investment in
one payments system technology does not preclude investment in another such technology; therefore, no
switch needs to be made.
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employees have to spend learning a new payment system (a start-up hassle cost) and the
time and effort they spend running a credit card through a reader and then printing out the
receipt (a per transaction hassle cost). This investment of time and effort on the part of
employees is a real cost to the merchants, because the employees could have been spent
the time and effort on training to provide better service (in the case of the start-up cost) or
on providing more timely delivery of another patron’s meal to her table (in the case of the
per transaction cost).
More speculatively, a merchant may adopt a payment system not just because of
the revenues that will result, but because of the status that she thinks it will bring her; in
other words, the restaurant might start accepting credit cards not because of the additional
revenues, but because the owner wants to be seen as “high-end.” This obviously requires
a departure from the assumption of the merchant as a simple profit-maximizer, but we
believe such a departure may be warranted for at least some subset of merchants.43
B. Consumer Decisions to Adopt a Payment System
Consumers’ decisions about whether to adopt a payment system into their
respective portfolios of options ought to be similar, but not identical, to that of merchants.
One difference is that, unlike merchants, consumers may not view the start-up costs
associated with the adoption of a payment system as trivial, particularly when they are
unfamiliar with it. Consider E-ZPass, a form of stored value card used on highways in
the Northeast and the Midwest. In the E-ZPass system, a customer sets up an account
with an E-ZPass member organization. Customers usually fund and periodically refill the
account with a credit card, although some customers use cash or checks. Assuming that
the account has money, the customer may pay her tolls on any E-ZPass participating
highway by an automatic signal from a radio frequency identification (“RFID”)
transponder. Adopting E-ZPass involves a good deal of hassle start-up costs: the
43

At least one commentator suggested to us that a merchant may need to offer a credit card option, not to
increase revenues, but to maintain revenues when competitors start to accept credit cards. We believe that
this is a distinction without a difference. At any given time, the question for the restaurant is whether the
additional revenues from adding a credit card option, discounted to present value, exceed the discounted
additional revenues that would be generated from an alternative investment. When a merchant offers a
credit card payment option to stave off defections by customers, this is additional revenue, because without
the credit card option, there would be lower revenues in the future.
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customer must fill out an application, mail it in or submit it on-line, receive back the
RFID transponder, and then attach the transponder to the car.44 Furthermore, if the
customer does not use a credit card, the funding of the E-ZPass account with cash or
checks can involve some additional hassle per transaction costs.45
Just as a merchant seeks to maximize profits in its investment decisions, a
consumer seek to maximize their expected utility, which is a function of the benefits and
costs of any particular decision she makes:
EU(A) = B(A) – C(A)

(5)

The expected utility of an alternative choice is also a function of that choice’s benefits
and costs:
EU(B) = B(B) – C(B)

(6)

Assuming that A and B are alternative payment systems, a consumer should pick the new
system, B, when the expected utility of that system exceeds the expected utility of the old
system, A, such that:
EU(B) – EU(A) > 0,

(7)

B(B) – C(B) – (B(A) – C(A)) > 0

(8)

Or

44

See http://www.ezpassnj.com/static/signup/ind_plans.shtml. (last visited Sept. 5, 2006).
For consumers who pay by check, they must replenish the account by sending in a check in a timely
fashion. For those consumers who have neither a credit card nor a checking account, they must make these
payments either by money order (which necessitates obtaining the money order) or in cash at an E-ZPass
facility (which is usually relatively inaccessible). For instance, in the state of New Jersey, there are only
three E-ZPass service centers, and the state of New York has only eight, although for reasons we cannot
fathom, there are actually two in and around Buffalo. See http://www.ezpassnj.com/static/info/csc.shtml
(last visited Sept. 5, 2006); http://www.e-zpassny.com/static/info/csc.shtml (same).
45
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As we saw in Equation 2 in the previous section, costs for payments systems consist of
both the start-up costs and the per transaction costs:
C = SC + TC

(9)

Furthermore, consumers need not adopt a new payment system for all transactions; a
consumer can choose to obtain a credit card, but still pay for most transactions with cash
or check. Therefore, what really matters to a consumer is whether there is some subset of
transactions, i, for which Equation (8) is true:
Bi(B) > Bi(A) + SC(B) + TCi(B) – TCi(A)46

(10)

Unlike benefits and per transaction costs, we do not limit start-up costs to those for i
transactions, on the theory that the start-up costs are the same regardless of the size of the
subset of transactions. For instance, the costs of obtaining a debit card are the same
regardless of whether the consumer will use it only to get cash from an ATM or will use
it for all of her purchases. In addition, we ignore the start-up costs associated with the
pre-existing payment option, because those costs are sunk. However, as we will note
below, in some circumstances sunk costs may play a role in decision-making about
payment systems.
As an example, consider a consumer’s decision to obtain a new credit card. As
with the E-ZPass example above, there will be some start-up hassle costs in obtaining the
card, and perhaps even a small fee associated with the card. The real question for the
consumer, given these start-up costs, is whether there is a set of transactions for which

46

Professors Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole hypothesize that a customer should purchase a payment
card only if the expected benefit exceeds the expected fee. See Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole,
Cooperation Among Competitors: Some Economics of Payment Card Associations, 33 RAND J. Econ. 549,
553(2002). Our analysis here is similar, but with some modifications. First, we make clear the distinction
between start-up costs for a system and per transaction costs, and we assume that the costs that really drive
decision-making by consumers are not financial, but rather temporal and psychic. (Rochet and Tirole
describe the fee as the “customer’s yearly fee,” id. at 553, and not as a per actual transaction fee, suggesting
it is just meant to cover up-front fees). Second, our version recognizes that the benefit available to the
consumer is limited to those circumstances where the benefits of a particular payment system are greater
than those of other systems. In other words, the benefit that Rochet and Tirole identify can only be
calculated as a net against the existing benefits from other payment systems.
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the consumer’s additional benefits from having the card exceed the additional costs of
having the card:
Bi(B)– TCi(B) – Bi(A) + TCi(A) > SC(B)47

(11)

Assume that in the past, the consumer has paid for her gasoline purchases using cash, but
that her service station’s owner, who we will call Gas Co., is offering her a credit card
with which to purchase gasoline in the future. We will assume that the consumer
receives no benefit from using cash and that the costs of obtaining cash are quite low.
Furthermore, there are no actual financial costs for using cash (because she has ready
access to her bank’s ATMs, which charge her no fees) and that the marginal hassle cost
of getting cash for such transactions is quite low: say the discounted present value of such
costs is $100. Filling out the application and obtaining the card from Gas Co. involves no
financial fee, but let us assume that there is a real hassle cost involved, and that this can
be quantified as the equivalent of $50. Furthermore, we will assume that Gas Co. offers
her no benefit from the use of the card, although the transaction costs are reduced to
$75.48 On this account, the consumer ought to decline the card, because it results in an
expected net decrease in her utility: SC(B) = $50, while Bi(B)– TCi(B) – Bi(A) + TCi(A)
= $25.
To remedy this problem, Gas Co. might introduce a rebate program that gives the
consumer 5% cash back on all purchases made with the Gas Co. card over a calendar
year. If the discounted present value of that rebate is, say, $50, now the consumer should

47

Admittedly, in theory we need to account for the lost opportunity cost on alternative investments of the
start-up costs, as we did in Part II.A. We do not do so here because we believe that such costs are generally
quite low. First, the lost opportunity cost for the investment of “hassle” just is, we believe, the hassle cost.
For example, when a consumer fills out a credit card application, the hassle cost just is the lost opportunity
of watching ESPN or E! Channel reruns, or some similar activity Of course, the consumer perhaps ought
to have put that time to better use, but probably would not have. Thus, for nonquantifiable costs, the
concept of hassle at least incorporates the lost opportunity cost. Second, for quantifiable costs, there is
obviously a real lost opportunity cost that we are not considering; however, because we assume that these
quantifiable start-up costs tend to be quite low (such as the cost of a postage stamp on the return of a credit
card application), we cheat and ignore this problem.
48
Even assuming that the consumer can be sure that she will never pay credit fees for running a revolving
balance on the card, she still has the hassle of making monthly payments to Gas Co. and any financial fees
involved in make such payments, such as the purchase of additional checks, etc.
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adopt the card, because the start-up costs ($50) are outweighed by the net gain on the
other side of Equation 11: $75.
One difficulty with consumer decisions about payment systems is that many of
the costs are nonquantifiable costs, such as hassle costs, and that consumers will tend to
be quite heterogeneous in how they value these costs. Return again to our Gas Co.
example. We hypothesized that the consumer faced lower transaction costs for a credit
transaction than for a cash transaction. If such costs are limited to hassle costs, this may
strike most readers as intuitively correct, because they pump their own gas and can pay
with a credit card right at the pump, whereas cash payments may require going into an
office, and may even require pre-payment. The assumption does not strike us as
intuitively correct, however, because we both live in New Jersey, where we cannot pump
our own gas, and payments with cash are both quicker and generally friendlier
(particularly in winter, gas station attendants do not relish trudging back and forth with
credit cards while we sign). A New Jersey consumer, therefore, may need a greater
benefit to adopt the Gas Co. card than a consumer across the river in New York.
Furthermore, the willingness of New Jersey consumers to adopt the card will vary with
how much they disvalue the cost of paying with credit; some of us are simply less
sensitive, both to the time loss and the unfriendliness of the attendants.
Another problem is that the nonquantifiable costs are, we believe, quite diverse.
So far we have focused on the hassle of engaging in any particular transaction, but there
are other potential costs. For instance, consumers might be concerned not just with the
hassle of using a credit card, but with the potential loss of privacy as well. One “benefit”
of cash transactions is that they generally leave no record, whereas credit card payments
can generate a paper trail of exactly where a consumer has spent her money. For
instance, if one wants to hide certain transactions from a spouse, this is a powerful reason
to pay cash rather than credit.49
In addition, there is a risk of theft, both of money and of identity. When a
consumer adopts cash as a payment system, she obviously takes on the risk that she will
49

This remains true even in an age when cash transactions, to the extent they involve an ATM withdrawal,
generate some form of record. It is a lot safer to pay $1000 for jewelry for your mistress using cash rather
than using the credit card at Tiffany’s. Somewhat plausible stories for the $1000 withdrawal are easier to
generate than stories about who received the jewelry, not that either of us would know about this!
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be robbed at some point and lose the cash in her possession. The risk of this type of theft
is lower with the adoption of a credit card or even a debit card system: in both cases, a
consumer’s liability for unauthorized transactions is capped both by statute and by card
company practice. However, adoption of credit cards and debit cards may open up
consumers to the possibility of identify theft, which can impose both financial and nonfinancial costs.
There is also the problem of sunk costs. As Professor Richard Thaler has noted,
“only incremental costs and benefits should affect decisionmaking.”50 But in reality,
historical costs appear to affect the decisions that consumers make in the future.
Consider again the consumer who has gone through the hassle of setting up an E-ZPass
account and obtaining the RFID transponder.

Once the consumer has E-ZPass, the

hassle becomes a sunk cost that the consumer ought to ignore (as a normative matter) in
making decisions about how she will pay for particular tolls.51 Indeed, the consumer will
inevitably encounter situations where the cash alternative is superior to E-ZPass, such as
when the driver has coins readily available and the E-ZPass lines are longer than the
others.52 But because ours is a positive model, we assume, in accord with the
experimental evidence, that such sunk costs do affect consumer decisions about payment
systems, such that previous costs incurred to obtain access to a payment system will
make the consumer more likely to use the system.53 For instance, consumers who have
paid for access to a charge card may be more willing to use that card in the future than
they otherwise would be.54
The benefits to consumers from various payment services can also be
nonquantifiable and quite diverse. As we have already suggested, the most obvious
examples of financial benefits to adopting a payment system are reward or affinity

50

Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39, 47 (1980).
See id.
52
On some roads, such as the Garden State Parkway, not all toll lanes accept E-ZPass.
53
See Thaler, supra note 50.
54
There are other transaction costs that may appear to be sunk costs but are not. For example, say that a
consumer is deciding whether or not to pay in cash or write a check for a purchase. In order to write a
check, the consumer would have first had to decide to purchase checks, which will necessarily have cost
the consumer money. Although this prior purchase of checks might be seen as a sunk cost, it is not. The
consumer will correctly intuit that writing a check brings her closer to having to buy more checks: the price
of a check is properly a cost of writing one. This is actually (in our terminology) a per transaction cost for
the consumer. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
51
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systems: either a small rebate on the purchase, or credit toward a reward (such as a free
airline ticket).55 As for non-financial benefits, a consumer might value the ability of the
payment system to generate a record of the transaction (the flip-side of our privacy cost
point above). Prestige or social standing is another potential benefit of some payment
systems. For instance, some people may pay with a “platinum” credit card instead of
another credit card, not because the rate is cheaper or the hassle lower, but simply to gain
the prestige that they believe is associated with having and using the card.56 In other
contexts, some consumers may wish to use a payment system to indicate that they are
“tech-savvy.” For instance, when the New York City Transit Authority introduced the
Metrocard, it believed that earlier users would be just such individuals.57 Of course,
consumers may have completely idiosyncratic reasons for liking the older payment form.
Think, for instance, of the 40-year-old who still eats Kraft Macaroni and Cheese. We58
can be fairly certain that, if he was tasting it for the first time, he would choose something
else, but the whole point is that it is not his first taste. As with food, familiarity and
tradition may provide much of a payment system’s appeal. For example, checks have
proven remarkably persistent despite the many electronic alternatives, particularly for
payment from remote locations. The most common explanation for this persistence is
that individuals are simply wedded to tradition.59 The comfort that comes from
maintaining the tradition weighs in any decision toward maintaining the status quo.
Finally, because ours is a positive model, we focus in both this section and the
next section on how consumers actually perceive the costs and benefits we are
describing, not on the “real value” of these costs and benefits, even when they are easily
quantifiable. For example, to the extent that consumers fail to account for some real
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Mann, Credit Card Policy, supra note 21, at 43-44.
See, e.g,, Kirk Johnson, Pending in Guilded Style, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1983, at § 3, p. 12; Carole Goul,
Personal Finance: In Credit Cards, All that Glitters, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1986, at § 3, p.9; Jane Wolfe,
Vicarious Consumption: Beyond the Glow of Platinum, Dec. 5, 1999, § 3, p. 10.
What may really matter is having, as opposed to using, the card. But because possession of the
card may be hard to signal without use, consumers use the cards to signal possession, which then signals
social standing.
57
See Matthew L. Wald, Fare Card Plan in the Subways Exceeds Goals, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1994, at 39
(noting that it was unclear if such people had actually adopted the Metrocard).
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Or at least Waldeck.
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Sujit Chakravoti & Carrie Jankowski, Forces shaping the payments environment: A summary of the
Chicago Fed’s 2005 Payments Conference, Chicago Fed Letter No. 219, at 2 (Oct. 2005).
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costs—for instance, they may not take into account the full costs of using a credit card—
we accordingly discount them.60
C.

Consumer Decisions to Use a Payment System

This brings us to the second-stage decision: the consumer’s choice among
payment systems for a particular transaction. Our basic postulate is that a consumer will
pick payment system B (say, a credit card) over payment system A (say, cash) for a
particular transaction, j, when the expected utility for using the credit card exceeds the
expected utility of using cash:
EUj(B) > EUj(A).61

(12)

In these expected utility functions, consumers weigh the benefits and per transaction
costs of the competing payment options, because the start-up costs for both systems are
now sunk, such that B should be selected over A where:
Bj(B)– TCj(B) > Bj(A) – TCj(A)

(13)

The other main important conceptual difference between Equation 11 and Equation 13 is
that, here, the consumer is selecting a payment system not on the anticipated benefits and
costs for a hypothetical set of transactions, but instead for a particular transaction. In
other words, at this stage the consumer (generally) will have better information about the
actual value of the costs and benefits of a particular payment system.
As an example, return to a consumer’s choice to adopt the card from Gas Co. and
now assume that our consumer lives in New York and works in New Jersey. In making
the decision as to whether to adopt the credit card, she faces uncertainty as to where she
is going to make her gasoline purchases. On the one hand, if she makes all of them in
60

See generally Bar-Gill, supra note 20, at 1395-1408 (giving a positive account of consumer choice within
the credit card market).
61
See also Wilko Bolt & Alexander F. Tieman, Skewed Pricing in Two-Sided Markets: An IO Approach,
DNB Research Papers (Oct. 2004), at 5-6, available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/dnb/dnbwpp/013.html.
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New York (where again she pumps her own gas), it makes sense to get the card, because
the transaction costs for credit are less than the transaction costs for cash. On the other
hand, if she makes all of her gasoline purchases in New Jersey, where we hypothesize
that the transaction costs of credit outweigh the transaction costs of cash, then she should
not adopt the card. For the consumer in this situation, what drives the decision about
adoption is information about the likelihood of gasoline purchases in New York or New
Jersey.
At the point of the decision to use the card, however, this uncertainty is obviously
removed. If she is purchasing gasoline in New York, it makes sense to use the card,
because the marginal benefits of using credit over cash likely outweigh the marginal
transaction costs.62 If she is instead purchasing gasoline in New Jersey, the marginal
costs of using the card may outweigh the benefits, so the consumer will not choose to use
the card. The point is that at the time of the actual decision to use, the uncertainty has
been removed.
D. Network Effects and Multi-Sided Platforms
Up to this point, we have modeled the choices of consumers and merchants based
upon an implicit assumption that the benefits and costs to the parties are independent of
the choices made by other parties. But that assumption is clearly wrong. Payment
systems are subject to network effects: the benefits to both consumers and merchants of
adopting a new payment system turn, in large part, on the willingness of other market
participants to adopt or use that payment system.63 Consider again Equations 4 and 11.
The decision by a merchant to invest in a new payment system (Equation 4) depends
directly upon the additional revenue to be generated by the system. For there to be
additional revenue, there must be consumers who have both adopted the new system and
who will use it if the merchants offer it. If no potential customers of our hypothetical
restaurant have adopted the credit card, nor are likely to do so, then the restaurant is
62

This may not always be true, even in New York. The marginal benefits of use of the card, if they are
limited to the rebate, are likely to be constant. The marginal transaction costs could, however, vary.
63
Of course, the decision to use the payment system is not dependent in this way upon the willingness of
merchant’s to adopt the system: the ability to make a decision about use depends in the first instance upon
the merchant’s decision to have adopted that payment system.
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unlikely to see any additional revenue, and it is fairly certain that an alternative
investment would make sense.
A consumer’s decision to adopt a payment system (Equation 11) is similarly
dependent upon merchant adoption of the system. Recall that the following condition
must be fulfilled for a consumer to adopt a payment system:
Bi(B)– TCi(B) – Bi(A) + TCi(A) > SC(B)

(11)

The greater the number of transactions in which new system B can be used, the more
likely it is that we can identify some subset of such transactions for which Equation 11
will be true. For instance, we suggested in our Gas Co. example that the use of a 5%
rebate might be enough to get a consumer to adopt the card, depending upon the hassle
costs, and we also hypothesized a scenario in which use of the card in New York made
sense, but not in New Jersey. However, if not all Gas Co. stations take the card, or she
also buys gasoline at the stations of other companies that do not accept the card, then her
benefit from using the card will be lower, and perhaps insufficient to overcome the startup costs of adopting the card. On the other hand, if she can use the card not just to make
gasoline purchases at Gas Co., but food purchases at Fast Food Co., then her benefits
from the card may be even greater, making adoption of the card that much more likely.
The point is that merchant decisions to adopt a payment system increase the set of
possible transactions in which the conditions of Equation 11 for consumer adoption will
be met.
Not only are payment systems subject to network effects, but they are also multisided platforms. David Evans and Richard Schmalensee define such markets as having
three basic characteristics: (1) there are at least two distinct types of customers for the
product; (2) there is some benefit to be obtained from coordinating members of the
groups; and (3) there is an intermediary that, through coordination, can make the
members of the groups better off.64 Examples of such multi-sided platform networks
include operating systems (which make both software developers and computer users
better off), television stations (which make both advertisers and viewers better off), and
64

EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 21, at 134-35.
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payment systems (which have the potential to make both consumers and merchants better
off).65 Because they are multi-sided platforms, the benefits to a party of the network do
not depend upon the number of similar parties that are on the network, but instead upon
the number of parties there are on the other side of the platform. For instance, a video
game user traditionally did not care how many other players use a particular gaming
system; what she really cared about is how many video games are developed for the
system.66 Of course, sometimes the existence of other users on the same side of the
platform will be an additional benefit to a network, but the key to any such network is
having enough users on both sides of the platform. For instance, if your colleagues are
watching your favorite television show, water cooler talk might enhance your enjoyment
of it. But regardless of how much viewers enjoy a show, it will be cancelled unless
sufficient numbers of advertisers are interested in the program.67
A multi-sided platform network presents the very difficult chicken-or-the-egg
problem:68 unless both sides of the transaction can be convinced that they are better off
with the new payment system, it will not be adopted. And the presence of network
effects means that the willingness of, say, consumers to adopt the new system will
depend on merchants also adopting it. The result, as commentators have noted, is that
“[t]o gain critical mass in the marketplace, payment providers have to convince
simultaneously a large number of participants of the benefits of new payment
mechanisms.”69 Thus, the consumers and merchants whose behavior we model above are
not isolated from each other; rather, a merchant considering whether to adopt a new
payment form considers whether consumers are likely to adopt the same form, and vice
versa.
65

EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 21, at 136-38.
This may be less true now, as more gaming systems have remote multi-player games.
67
As a recent example, consider the demise of the CBS show, Joan of Arcadia. While the show was
plagued by declining ratings, the real factor leading to cancellation in 2005 seems to have been the age of
its average viewer: 53.9. See Fans demand 'Joan', fight CBS over cancellation, USA Today, May 30, 2005,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/life/2005-05-30-joan-arcadia-fans-petition_x.htm. That number
made the show very unattractive to advertisers, who prefer younger viewers.
68
This exists whenever payors and payees must adopt a new technology simultaneously for it to be
successful, “otherwise there is little incentive for consumers or merchants to embrace the new instrument.”
Chakravorti & Kobor, supra note X, at 7 n.12; see EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 21, at xiii.
69
Sujit Chakravorti & Carrie Jankowski, Forces Shaping the Payments Environment: A Summary of the
Chicago Fed’s 2005 Payments Conference, 219a Chicago Fed Letter (October 2005), available at
http://www.chicagofed.org/publications/fedletter/cfloctober2005_219a.pdf.
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E. The Difficulty of Achieving a Critical Mass
The rub, however, is that consumers and merchants are unlikely to be easily
convinced that they have the same interest in adopting (and using) a new payment
system. As Equations 4 and 11 illustrate, the conditions under which consumers and
merchants are likely to adopt a payment system are different. We predict that a merchant
will adopt a payment system whenever the additional revenues gained from adoption of
the system outweigh the additional revenues that could be generated from another
investment of those resources. For their part, consumers will adopt a new payment
system only where the start-up costs for adopting the system are outweighed by the
increase in net benefits and costs from moving to the new system for some set of
transactions.
Not every new payment system, though, will satisfy both Equations 4 and 11. As
an example, recall the introduction of stored value cards on the Upper West Side, where
Equation 4 for merchants appears to have been satisfied, but not Equation 11 for
consumers. Here, merchants appear to have had quite limited start-up costs, which
suggests that the additional revenues from the cards need not have been great for
merchants to be willing to offer them. Furthermore, to the extent some consumers
converted from cash to the use of the stored value cards, merchants presumably would
have seen additional revenues in the form of a reduced risk of theft of the funds by
robbers or employees.
For consumers, however, it does not appear that Equation 4 was satisfied. The
stored value cards in this experiment were distributed as microchip-based smart cards
placed onto debit cards, which were then sent by the banks involved to their customers
who lived on the Upper West Side. In the existing payments universe at the time, stored
value cards competed with cash and (to a lesser degree) debit cards.70 It is hard to see
any set of transactions in which the stored value card was better than either cash or a
debit card. Consumers had to load the stored value card at an ATM, so the card involved
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The experiment was initiated in 1997. At the time, debit cards were a fast-growing subset of payments,
but still a fraction of what they are today. See HAYASHI ET AL., surpa note 21, at 41-43.
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just as much hassle as getting cash, and had no lowered costs or added benefits. Indeed,
the cards were not safer than cash because, assuming a consumer was robbed of her cash,
her cards were likely to be taken as well, and the stored value would be lost.71 Stored
value cards also did not improve the consumer’s position as compared to debit cards,
because both could be used for the same kind of transaction, and presumably most
merchants who were wired to accept stored value cards would also accept debit cards. In
addition, debit cards, which required the use of a PIN, had additional security. The “cash
back” feature of debit cards also allowed greater access to funds. In sum, no set of
transactions existed for which consumers would prefer stored value cards. Thus, even if
the start-up costs associated with the cards were quite low, consumers simply had no
incentives to adopt them.
Despite the absence of benefits to one side of the transaction, a new payment
system can still thrive if the payment platform provider can internalize both some of the
gains of one party and the costs of the other party, and thereby make adoption of the
system more likely. One way to do this is for the platform provider to give a benefit to
one side of the platform to stimulate adoption. For instance, in our Gas Co. example, we
imagined the consumer being given a 5% rebate as a way of encouraging adoption. In
the real world, similar examples exist. For instance, while general use stored value cards
have not succeeded in the market, proprietary stored value cards have had more success.
In such transactions, the merchant and the platform are the same entity (as they are in our
Gas Co. example), and therefore the merchant/platform can internalize the costs to the
consumers by directly offering other benefits to the consumer to entice use of the card.
For instance, Starbucks has heavily promoted its Starbucks Card, which is a stored value
card that consumers can use to make purchases in the store. Between October and the
end of December 2005, consumers placed more than 35% more value on Starbucks Cards
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Professor Leo van Hove suggests that stored value cards may be better for consumers than cash, because
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than they had a year earlier.72 At first, such increased usage is perplexing, given that
consumers can use cash or offline debit cards at most Starbucks locations. However, a
large portion of the loaded value in the quarter represents money placed on gift cards:
almost 75% of the value placed on the cards occurred in one of the three months–
December.73 The question, of course, is whether individuals who received the gift cards
will reload them with their own funds. To this end, Starbucks has taken another initiative
to get consumers to use the Starbucks Card: it has tied the Starbucks card to a credit card,
the Duetto card. At the end of each month, the consumer automatically receives a reward
in the amount of 1% of the purchases made on the Duetto credit card over that month.
Another complication for initiating a new payment platform is the fact we noted
in Part II.B: the benefits from the use of a payment system are more varied and they
include potentially substantial non-financial benefits to a particular system. Furthermore,
some of these benefits may tend to lock a consumer into an existing payment system in a
way that merchants are not locked in. In the Starbucks example we just used, some
consumers may tend to continue using a store-branded stored value card out of loyalty:
being seen by others as a regular Starbucks consumer may bring them some value. For
many other consumers, though, there will be no such value to possession of the Starbucks
card, and this consideration will play no role in their decision to use (or more likely not
use) the card.
This heterogeneity in the value of payment systems to consumers is a problem in
gaining acceptance of the systems. Many of the benefits offered by service providers to
entice one set of consumers to use a particular payment system will have no value to most
other users. As a result, even if payment providers succeed in attracting a small number
of consumers to the new payment mechanism, they will not obtain a critical mass.
The history of charge and credit cards provides an example of this phenomenon.
Charge cards, particularly the American Express card, experienced substantial growth
through the 1950s, 60s and 70s. The overall penetration of charge cards nonetheless
remained quite low by our present standards: by 1977, American Express (which was by
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this time the dominant pure charge card) had “merely” 8 million cardholders.74 Indeed,
the peak penetration of charge cards into American households occurred in 1989, when
13% of Americans had such cards.75 The difficulty for charge cards was and is that their
benefits as a payment system are limited.76
Credit cards, by comparison, have experienced far greater market penetration. In
1970, the percentage of American households holding a credit card was only 16%—
roughly the same percentage at which charge cards reached their peak.77 By 2001, the
market penetration of credit cards had exploded to almost 73%.78 Credit cards have done
so much better than charge cards over the last thirty-five years because they offer a wider
range of benefits to consumers, leading to wider acceptance of the cards by merchants,
which in turn has led to even more use by consumers.
What differences between charge cards and credit cards led to these wildly
divergent outcomes? The most important is the ability of credit cards to extend a
revolving line of credit to consumers. This is, in itself, a benefit that may often lead
consumers to use a credit card over other options. Furthermore, changes in both
technology and the law made it easier to offer revolving credit to consumers in the 1970s
and 1980s. With the rise of computer technology and information processing, credit card
issuers were better able to identify consumers who would be both interested in adopting a
card and profitable for the payment provider. Furthermore, after the Supreme Court
decided that local usury laws would generally not restrict the interest rates charged by
credit card companies,79 it became profitable to lend to consumers who had previously
been deemed too risky.80 The increased profits available from lines of credit then
allowed credit card issuers to draw in other consumers through reward and affinity
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programs. The net result was a wide range of benefits that allowed credit cards to vastly
increase their market share.81
The importance of satisfying the heterogeneous interests of potential users raises a
broader point about efficiency. As we have previously discussed, payment systems have
financial costs for merchants and consumers. Often, an emerging payment system will
hold the promise of net financial gains for users on both sides of the platform. But if the
payment provider does not find a means of satisfying or overriding the disparate interests
of potential users, the system will not be widely adopted. Because emerging payment
forms often have lower service costs than their pre-existing competitors, improvements in
payment systems can create clear economic benefits. But the market, left to itself, will
not always adopt the most efficient system. That is, the payment system with the lower
service cost may not be able to obtain a critical mass of users, at least not in the absence
of government intervention.
Part III. Governmental Roles
Our central inquiry is whether and how the government can influence public
preferences about payment systems, so as to increase the likelihood of success for a
particular payment form. In the context of payments, government assumes multiple
roles: fiduciary, seller, and law-maker. What government can and should do depends in
part on the role that it has assumed. In this Part, then, we briefly examine the government
in each of these roles.
As fiduciary, the federal government has two closely related goals: (1) to ensure
that payees will accept coins and currency, and (2) to increase the demand for coins and
currency by encouraging consumers to use new forms. These goals are intimately
81
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connected because if payees refuse particular coins and currency, then payors are
unlikely to use them. For instance, the Treasury Department introduced new colors on
the $20 bill in 2003, the $50 bill in 2004, and on the $10 bill in 2006. Between 1996 and
2000, the Treasury introduced updated versions of the $5, $10, $20, $50, and $100 bills.82
In support of many of these changes, the Treasury Department undertook substantial
advertising campaigns to ensure both payee acceptance and payor use of the new bills.
Less successfully, the Treasury Department has also attempted to gain support for dollar
coins on several occasions.83
While “fiduciary” is probably the government’s most well-known role with regard
to payments, it is increasingly common for government to act as seller; that is, for the
government to design a payment system for a service it purveys. Governmental agencies
have long created payment systems for the collection of fares connected with both public
and private transportation; in particular, they have encouraged and in some cases even
required the use of tokens to pay fares both on toll roads and on buses and trains.84 In the
electronic age, governmental agencies have put strong pressure on riders and drivers to
cease paying fares and tolls in cash and instead to adopt new, electronic forms of
payment. For instance, drivers all along the East Coast have been encouraged to adopt EZPass by the liberal use of discounts in tolls.85 Similarly, when the New York City
Transportation Authority first introduced Metrocards, discounts were considered essential
to obtaining consumer acceptance of the cards.86
In its third role as law-maker, the government attempts to influence consumer
choices in situations where it is neither the seller of services nor the fiduciary of the
payment system. Instead, the government provides laws or regulations that work to
82
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improve the social acceptance of a particular payment system. Check 21, enacted in 2003
and discussed in the Introduction, is the most recent example of this sort of governmental
action.87
When the government acts as law-maker, it may have little direct interest in the
underlying payment system.88 For instance, the government has only a small financial
interest in the existence of a robust check collection system, and therefore little direct
interest in whether substitute checks succeed or fail.89 When the government acts as
seller, it obviously has a much larger financial stake in the success of enterprises such as
Metrocard and E-ZPass. Similarly, the government’s interest in the checking system is
qualitatively different than its interest in payment systems when it acts a fiduciary: the
acceptance of substitute checks does not appear to be vital to the continued functioning of
the economy in the way that the acceptance of United States currency is.
The government does, of course, have a general interest in payment systems.
After all, as we noted in the previous Part, some payment systems are more efficient than
others. Efficiency is generally good for society, so the government has reason to promote
it.90 The government, however, also has an interest in being responsive to the other
subjective preferences of consumers (and perhaps even merchants). After all, efficiency
is not (nor should it be) the only criterion by which to judge governmental action.
Indeed, as we discuss later,91 politicians who disregard subjective preferences may pay a
heavy price at the ballot box. But in the next Part, we assume that the government has a
legitimate interest in changing endogenous preferences about payment systems in pursuit
of efficiency and perhaps other goals. We thus proceed to examine and evaluate the tools
government has at its disposal.
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Part IV. Affecting Preferences and Network Effects
Whether and how the government affects payment preferences depends on the
role that the government has assumed, its precise goal, and the particular sort of payment
system at issue. Depending on the situation, the government may (a) provide
information that allows individuals to coordinate their behavior, (b) pass legislation or
adopt policies aimed at reducing or eliminating concerns about a particular payment
form, (c) provide incentives to induce individuals to adopt new payment systems, or (d)
force change by eliminating or curtailing the older payment form. The next section
examines these options, each of which represents an incremental increase in the amount
of pressure placed on potential users of the new payment system.92
A. Focal Points and Information
As our earlier discussion of network effects suggested, payment systems require
coordination: in order for a consumer transaction to occur, the seller needs to accept the
payment form that the buyer tenders. The most innocuous means of facilitating
coordination is for the government simply to provide information about different
payment forms. The legend required by Check 2193 is one example of this approach, as is
the advertising campaign that accompanied the issuance of the revamped $20 bill. In
both these examples, government action helped ensure that the public recognized a
particular payment form as legitimate.
At a minimum, these sorts of informational efforts should ensure that a seller
accepts particular methods of payment, at least when the method of payment requires no
additional investment on the seller’s part. As a very simple example, a buyer may offer
an updated $20 when purchasing groceries. If the seller does not know that the bill is
legitimate, and the buyer does not have any alternative means of payment, the
coordination failure could result in a lost sale. But if the government has informed the
seller through advertising of the bill’s legitimacy, she is likely to accept it. Similarly, a
92
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seller who demands proof of payment is likely to accept a substitute check, provided she
knows it is the legal equivalent of a traditional cancelled check. At the very least, then,
government-supplied information helps ensure that individuals will accept one form of
payment when they really prefer another.
As previously suggested, however, the success of a new payment form depends
on overcoming the chicken-or-the-egg problem; not only does the public have to be
willing to adopt the new form, but merchants must be willing to accept it, which in turn
depends on merchants anticipating that a sufficient number of users will be on the
opposite side of the platform. Government-provided information may influence use
when it emphasizes the benefits of one payment form relative to another. For instance,
when the Mint launched the Sacagawea one-dollar coin, it purchased a commercial that
featured a vending machine repeatedly rejecting a frustrated individual’s one-dollar bill.94
The Mint ultimately decided against airing the commercial,95 but we can easily imagine
how a commercial demonstrating Sacagawea’s consumer advantages would encourage
use. That is, consumers would be initially attracted to the coin, vendors would anticipate
this attraction, and consumers would similarly anticipate that vending machines would
accept the coin. In other words, informational campaigns suggesting that one payment
form is superior to another might influence network effects by both affecting the
willingness of people to consider using the payment form in the first instance, and by
influencing the predictions people make about the behavior of individuals on the other
side of the platform.
Particularly when government is acting as fiduciary and seller, however, it may
want to do more than just ensure use and acceptance of a particular payment form.
Instead, it might desire that a particular payment form dominates. The government
introduces the dollar coin, the Metrocard, or some other payment method because it sees
an opportunity to increase efficiency and correspondingly reduce costs. As such, the
government may try to make a particular payment form the focal point around which
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individuals will voluntarily coordinate their behavior.96
As used in the economics literature, “focal point” refers to the place where
individuals who need to coordinate their behavior gravitate. In Thomas Schelling’s
famed example, for instance, two parachuters who are unexpectedly separated must find
each other. Schelling illustrates how one point on their maps may be focal, or the place
where each would expect the other to go in order to meet up.97 Richard McAdams uses
Robert Sugden’s Crossroads game to illustrate how government speech can create focal
points.98 In the Crossroads game, two cars approach an intersection on different roads.
Both drivers prefer to maintain their respective speeds and have the other driver yield.
Each driver’s paramount interest, however, is in avoiding the collision that would occur if
they both maintained speed. McAdams discusses how the state can erect signs that,
independent of any legal sanction, act as focal points that allow drivers to coordinate
whether to yield or continue forward.99 Note that in both the parachuter and Crossroads
examples, what is dominant or focal may not reflect an individual’s personal preference.
That is, the parachuter who is many miles away from the focal bridge may prefer to meet
elsewhere, just as the driver whom the sign instructs to yield would prefer to continue
forward. In each example, however, the individual subverts his own subjective
preference because the need to coordinate is paramount.
One might expect that government-provided information is particularly likely to
influence the public’s choice of a particular payment system. Richard McAdams has
posited that the law influences behavior because it creates expectations about how others
will behave, and that people then coordinate their behavior around these expectations.100
McAdams argues that the law is particularly effective at creating focal points, because (a)
new laws often receive publicity, which helps create expectations; (b) legal expression is
unique, and thus stands out from competing expressions; and (c) legal officials have a
reputation for correctly predicting future behavior.101 All of these factors make the legal
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message louder, and thus more focal, than alternative messages. While McAdams is
careful to note that loudness does not depend on the morality that is often associated with
the law, he concedes that the legitimacy of the law matters because it further helps
distinguish the legal message from the rest.102
McAdams’ argument suggests that the government should be especially effective
at making a particular payment system focal. Because the national government acts as
fiduciary, it has particular legitimacy when speaking about payment methods. While this
is most obviously true when the message concerns United States coins and currency, the
authority should spill over to matters that are not directly connected to what constitutes
legal tender. Moreover, the message should be highly salient when the government is
selling a service like transportation; the message, after all, informs the buyer which sort
of payment the seller prefers.
The Crossroads and parachuter examples, however, should illustrate the difficulty
of convincing individuals to coordinate around a payment form that runs counter to their
own preferences. Each example offers only one opportunity to coordinate, which stands
in stark contrast to the realities of payment systems. That is, the parachuters’ maps may
show many possible meeting spots, but unless each parachuter independently decides to
go to the same place, they will not survive. Similarly, one driver has to yield and the
other has to go, or else the cars will crash or indefinitely stall.
With payments, however, myriad alternatives allow for coordination. That is, so
long as alternative payment methods retain their legitimacy, the consumer does not risk
coordination failure when she eschews a specific payment form. Most sellers will accept
more than one form of payment; if a seller does accept only one form, it usually will be
currency and coins, which everyone uses to some extent. Government-supplied
information may influence expectations about how many users will be on the opposite
side of the platform, and therefore may affect the willingness of merchants and
consumers to adopt a payment system. After all, in equations (4) and (11), merchants
and consumers are attempting to make predictions about the likelihood of increased
simply be predicting future behavior, when in fact the law they promulgate actually shapes behavior. Id. at
1672.
102
Id. at 1670.
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utility from adopting the new system, and information supplied by the government about
use by parties on the other side of the transaction can naturally alter these calculations.
But information alone is unlikely to lead to increased use.103 When the customer chooses
among the payment systems she has already adopted, she knows which of her options the
merchant will accept. Thus, coordination is beside the point. The question, then, is what
else the government can do to affect decisions to use payment systems.
B. Gently Addressing Particular Concerns
Sometimes the refusal to use a new payment method may result from a particular
concern about one or more aspects of the new method. For example, as credit cards
became increasingly popular in the 1960s, the possibility of theft and unauthorized
charges received much the same kind of attention that identity theft receives today.104
Congress responded to this concern in 1970, when it amended the Truth in Lending Act
to provide that credit card holders are responsible for no more than $50 worth of
fraudulent charges.105 At about the same time, Congress established specific criminal
penalties for the fraudulent use of a credit card.106 As another example, in 1978,
Congress noted that while “the use of electronic systems to transfer funds provides the
potential for substantial benefits to consumers,” it was nonetheless problematic that the
“rights and liabilities of consumers” were undefined.107 Thus, as part of its Electronic
Funds Transfer Act, the federal government limited an account holder’s liability for
unauthorized electronic fund transfers to $50.108
In all of these examples, the government spoke to consumers in its legislative
role. These statutes simultaneously reassure consumers and endorse the controversial
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payment form. The statutes limiting liability directly address a source of consumer
reticence by ensuring that the financial institution, not the consumer, bears the risk of
fraud. The statutes thus actively and visibly eliminated one barrier to widespread use,
and thereby underscored governmental support for the new payment system. As for the
statute imposing criminal liability, it also sent a message to consumers: that the
government took credit card theft seriously and was taking steps to prevent it. Some
consumers may have believed that with a criminal statute in place specifically addressing
credit card fraud, fewer individuals would engage in fraud in the first instance. All of
these statutes, then, illustrate an approach in which the government behaves more
proactively than when it simply provides information and attempts to create focal points
around which individuals can coordinate.
In addition to addressing particular concerns about fraud, the statutes influence
network effects, albeit gently. Because these statutes remove a barrier to use, they make
both consumers and merchants more confident that the particular payment system will
become widespread. With this increasing confidence, more consumers, merchants, and
institutions will invest in the new payment method. Their actions will have a feedback
effect: as others become aware of this investment, they too will adopt the new form, and
so forth.
C. Providing Incentives or, Alternatively, Imposing Sanctions
Sometimes, however, no particularized concern animates an individual’s decision
to eschew a payment form. Instead, the reticence is purely the result of the (perhaps
irrational) preferences of individuals. When preferences are particularly strong, effective
government action must make the benefits of the new payment form either larger or more
tangible, or, alternatively, must make the non-user internalize the cost that her preference
imposes on third parties. In other words, effective governmental action must incentivize
use of the new payment form, or—depending on one’s perspective—sanction use of the
old payment form.
Such incentives can be quite effective. For example, Metrocard did not become
popular with New York City subways riders until the transit authority offered free bus
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transfers to Metrocard users,109 and discounted tolls often contribute to a highway
driver’s decision to use electronic payment.110 More indirect incentives may be effective
as well. For instance, highway authorities can increase the number of lanes dedicated to
electronic payment and decrease the number dedicated to traditional payment; after such
tinkering, non-electronic users will experience the “cost” of even longer lines. Indeed,
some highway authorities have gone so far as to reserve certain freeway entrances to
electronic payers. Each of these incentives, whether direct or indirect, magnifies the
costs of sticking with the old payment method.
In all these examples of incentives, of course, the government is acting as seller.
This is unsurprising, because incentives are often expensive, at least in the short-term.
When the government is acting as seller, it may have good reason to internalize the costs
of incentives, because the long-term benefits from a switch in payment systems will
outweigh the short-term costs. The problem for payment systems is that it may not
always be possible to find a party to internalize the network externalities of the system,
because the availability of profit opportunities may be limited. The most obvious
example of this involves situations where the government is acting as a fiduciary.
The story of the Susan B. Anthony dollar coin illustrates the problem. John
Caskey and Simon St. Laurent have persuasively argued that the coin failed because the
government did not understand the importance of network effects or the economic theory
underlying coin/note substitutions.111 When the government launched the Susan B.
Anthony in 1979, it was confident that the public would accept the coin and predicted
widespread circulation within three to four years. The coin, however, was a colossal
flop:
Despite the mint’s emphasis on designing a coin suitable for vending machines,
most machines were not recalibrated to accept it. Vendors had begun updating
their machines before the law passed, but as of 1979, only 250,000 of the four
million vending machines had been updated. The cost per machine was $25 to
$350 per machine, and given these costs, most vendors preferred to wait to see if
the coin would become widely used before converting their machines . . .
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At the same time, the media, public and retailers were criticizing the coins for
looking like a quarter, making it hard to distinguish.112 Consumers complained
about other features of the design, including color, reeded edge, and thickness.
Because consumers did not want the coin, cashiers rarely offered it as change.
Consumers declined to accept the coin from retailers as change, merchants
returned the coin to banks, and banks, unable to distribute them and facing high
storage costs, sent the coins back or did not reorder new ones.113
By January 1980, only 291 of the 750 million coins produced were in circulation. In
March 1980, the government altogether stopped production of the Susan B. Anthony
dollar.
The obvious problem with the Susan B. Anthony coin was network externalities.
Merchants who were deciding whether to accept the Susan B. Anthony were aware of the
accompanying costs, which included retooling vending machines or creating space in the
cash register drawers and the risk that employees would confuse the coin with a quarter
when counting money. From the merchant’s perspective, accepting the coin made sense
only if a large number of consumers would be presenting the Susan B. Anthony and if the
merchant was likely to lose sales if she did not accept the coin.
As we have discussed previously, however, consumers had an incentive to adopt
the coin only if a sufficiently large enough number of transactions existed where the
benefits of the coin overcame the costs imposed by adopting the coin.114 In this particular
context, such situations were pretty limited. The main benefit of the coin was that it
weighed less than the equivalent amount of quarters and would facilitate purchases in
vending machines under then-existing technology. The costs came in two forms: first,
the hassle of learning to identify the Susan B. Anthony as readily as other coins, and
second, having to forgo transactions with vending machines or other merchants that did
not yet accept the coin. Because at the beginning few vending machines accepted the
coins, the costs here generally outweighed the benefits.115 The resulting equilibrium was
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such that neither merchants nor consumers had an incentive to begin using the coin, and
unsurprisingly, the Susan B. Anthony dollar was a flop.
In contrast to the Susan B. Anthony, credit cards initially faced a similar
challenge but managed to overcome it. As S.J. Liebowitz and Stephen Margolis have
noted more generally as to network externalities, the failure to adopt a new, superior
standard represents “a profit opportunity for someone who can figure out a means of
internalizing the [network] externality and appropriating some of the value made
available from changing to the superior standard.”116 In other words, in some cases, an
entrepreneur who can innovate a way to profit from the creation of a platform will find
ways to internalize the network externalities in order to facilitate adoption of the payment
system.117 An example of this again is the growth of first the charge card industry, and
then the credit card industry, over the past 50 years. In the first part of the story, charge
cards went through a period of rapid growth following the creation of the Diners Club
card because the founders of that card realized that they could make profits by extracting
a high merchant discount fee (~7%) and giving the card to consumers at a fairly low cost
(and a $5 annual fee).118 In other words, Diners Club, and then American Express, were

disproportionately had access to machines and merchants that accepted the coins and/or (b) they liked the
coin—in other words, they obtained some sort of psychic benefit from having the coin. The existence of
such a core of consumers will overcome the network externalities, however, only when it leads to what
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consumer demand, but merchant demand: consumers mostly had the means to make debit purchases—in
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able to internalize the costs of getting the cards into the hands of consumers by extracting
higher profits from merchants.119
In the second part of the story, as we described in Part II, credit cards became one
of the dominant forms of payments in the United States when credit card issuers learned
that they could make profits from the credit function of a credit card, which in turn
allowed the company to offer the payment service of the card at a lower price.120 This
bundling of products – the payment product and the credit product – was not enough,
however. The second important innovation was the improvements in the revolving credit
industry that allowed credit card issuers to make greater profits from the issuance of such
credit. Essentially, this created what might be seen as a three-sided platform market,
involving merchants and two types of consumers: those who are only transacting and
those who are financing. Credit card issuers also became more sophisticated in the
marketing of their credit product and in their ability to decide to whom they should
extend credit and under what terms.121 These innovations allowed them to (mostly)
eliminate annual fees, cut the costs charged to merchants,122 and expand the contexts in
which such cards could be used.123 In other words, credit cards grew as a payment
system because card issuers were able to extract more profits from consumers using the
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cards for financing services and thereby cut the costs of the cards to purely transacting
parties, which led to more merchants accepting the cards.124
The obvious question that arises, then, is why did the market not solve the
problem for the Susan B. Anthony in the same way it did for credit cards? The answer, at
least in the case of the Susan B. Anthony dollar, is that the profit opportunities for
overcoming the network externalities were close to non-existent. There were no widely
available additional products that could be bundled with the coin to underwrite its
adoption.125 Moreover, the government – the supplier of this particular multi-sided
platform – could not subsidize one side of the platform by extracting extra payments from
124
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soda company whose products are generally $1 (remember, this is just imaginary). Also suppose that the
soda company, by fostering adoption of the Susan B. Anthony dollar, might save large amounts in the
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another side. Of course, the government could have paid merchants and/or consumers to
use the coin, but the complete absence of a discussion of that possibility in the literature
suggests that it is beyond the pale.126
The strategy adopted by the credit card issuers is not the only way for a party to
try to overcome network externalities and promote a new payments system. As
Professors Shapiro and Varian point out, there are two basic ways to internalize switching
costs. The first is to reduce those costs by making it easier to switch products. This was
the method used by the charge card industry to get consumers to adopt the cards in the
1950s and 1960s. The second way is to increase the benefits available from the new
network, thereby making the benefits of the switch outweigh its costs.127 Increased
benefits may make a payment system essentially irresistible to one side. For instance,
restaurants and hotels accepted charge cards despite the quite high initial discount fees
because the cards attracted additional well-heeled customers. Thus, in our example of the
Susan B. Anthony coin, the government might still have succeeded if it was putting forth
a product that had much greater benefits for both consumers and merchants. But in
reality, the coin was not a radical improvement from the perspective of either group, and
therefore was doomed to failure.
What our analysis suggests so far is that the role the government plays largely
determines how far it will go to influence preferences about payment systems. When the
government is acting as seller, the cost savings associated with a particular electronic
payment form may spur the government to offer incentives, which in turn may overcome
strong individual preferences and network effects. When the government is acting as
law-maker, in contrast, it is likely to limit itself to providing information and addressing
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particularized concerns, and leave the incentivizing to the third-party institutions that
stand to gain from consumers making the switch. But so far, our analysis has suggested
that when the government is acting as fiduciary, it is relatively powerless in the face of
strong subjective preferences or network effects. That is, even when the government is
“smart” about influencing preferences, it is likely to be unsuccessful.
D. Withdrawing Alternative Payment Forms
The Sacagawea dollar coin is another case in point. The launch of “The Golden
Dollar”128 was accompanied in 2001 by a $67 million marketing and education
campaign.129 The Mint initially shipped large quantities of the coin not only to the
Federal Reserve, but also to Wal-Mart and other retailers, all in an effort to promote
widespread use.130 The coins were also give-aways in Cheerios boxes, at sporting events,
and at various transit hubs. These promotions distributed more than 132 million coins to
consumers. The Mint also conducted outreach to merchants in industry sectors that were
most likely to use the coin and increased the use of the coin in federal facilities, such as
post offices and military bases.
As almost any reader can deduce from looking in her pockets, all of these efforts
were of little avail. While the Mint’s efforts dramatically increased public awareness of
the coin, it had little effect on actual use. Demand for the coin was highest in the first
year of the launch and declined rapidly thereafter. In 2004, a General Accounting Office
poll found that 97 percent of Americans had not used the coin in the past month and that
74 percent could not remember ever using one. Because hindsight is twenty-twenty, it
may initially be difficult to see why the roll-out of the Sacagawea was “smart.” But in
fact, the Mint acted on almost every suggestion that had been made by experts who had
studied the Susan B. Anthony.131 Indeed, the government, in a very limited fashion, even
did what we suggested earlier was beyond the pale; that is, it paid merchants and
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consumers to use the coin, in the sense that it gave more than 132 million away for free
during promotionals.132 But in the face of particularly strong preferences and network
effects, the government, acting as fiduciary, was unable to convince consumers and
merchants to switch.
To be sure, the Mint could have pushed consumers and merchants toward
widespread use of the Sacagawea by withdrawing the competing dollar note. Indeed,
most experts agree that in light of public resistance to using a dollar coin and the
“psychological cost associated with a change of a habit,”133 no dollar coin will succeed
until the dollar bill is withdrawn from circulation.134 In the countries that make up the G7, the United States is the only one that attempts to co-circulate a high-denomination coin
and a note of the same value.135 Other G-7 countries, such as Canada, the United
Kingdom, and Japan, have succeeded in introducing high-denomination coins by
withdrawing the competing note.136 This, in turn, suggests that, even when government
is unable to provide strong incentives or to create a payment form that has a much greater
benefit for both consumers and merchants,137 it can ensure the success of the payment
form by eliminating or severely curtailing the alternatives.
1. Forcing the Public’s Hand
Withdrawing or curtailing the competing payment system may initially seem
counter to the current wisdom among those who study how the government can most
effectively influence social behavior. Dan Kahan, for example, has theorized about
situations in which lawmakers attempt to change pervasive social norms, such as the
belief that “no sometimes means yes” or that it is acceptable to drink and drive.138 Kahan
has argued that “gentle nudges” are more effective than “hard shoves,” or in other words,
that lawmakers can change prevalent social norms with a series of incremental measures
aimed at gradually affecting public opinion. As one example, Kahan contrasts the
ineffective tobacco prohibitions of the early 20th century with the “pattern of escalating
132
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change” that began with warning labels in the 1960s and culminated with severe
restrictions on public smoking in the 1990s.139 Kahan argues that the former were
“contemptuously defied” because outright prohibition condemned smoking more
strongly than most of the public did, and that the latter succeeded because it helped
“ground an emerging perception of smokers as deviants, as well as an emerging
expectation that individuals conform to the anti-smoking norm.”140
Kahan summarizes his argument this way:
If the law condemns . . . the conduct substantially more than does the
typical decisionmaker, the decisionmaker’s personal aversion to condemning too
severely will dominate her inclination to enforce the law, and she will balk. Her
reluctance to enforce, moreover, will strengthen the resistance of other
decisionmakers, whose reluctance will steel the resolve of still others, triggering
a self-reinforcing wave of resistance.
If, however, the law condemns the behavior only slightly more than does
the typical decisionmaker, her desire to discharge her civic duties will override
her reluctance to condemn, and she will enforce the law. Her willingness to
enforce will now strengthen the willingness of other decisionmakers to enforce. . .
. In the resulting wave of condemnation, lawmakers will be able to increase the
degree of condemnation reflected in the law without prompting resistance from
most decisionmakers.141
In other words, laws aimed at changing norms will be successful if they gradually pull
public opinion forward, but will produce detrimental backlash when they attempt to force
a sudden change of public opinion. While Kahan is primarily concerned with questions
of norm management, preferences are relevant here too. Whether a decisionmaker
complies with the law is a function of the interaction between “her personal degree of
condemnation and her preferences to discharge her legal obligations.”142
However, our study of payment systems suggests that, sometimes, changing
preferences necessitates hard shoves; that, without them, preference change will be
unsuccessful.143 So why, in this context, should the government sometimes force the
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public’s hand? The answer hinges on condemnation, which, as the above quotation
suggests, is central to Kahan’s analysis.
For the most part, Kahan’s hard shoves are ones that involve the criminal law; his
hypothetical decisionmakers are prosecutors, jurors, and sentencing judges. A criminal
conviction and the resulting punishment symbolize condemnation by one’s fellow
citizens. Kahan hypothesizes that decisionmakers resist hard shoves because they are
unwilling to condemn; that is, when the law punishes behavior more severely than the
decisionmaker would prefer, the decisionmaker will sometimes choose not to enforce the
law.
But while condemnation is inherent in the criminal law, the decision to forego a
particular payment method is unlikely to form the basis for condemnation. Take, for
instance, the individual who steadfastly refuses the Sacagawea coin. Even the hardest
possible shove—that is, the withdrawal of the competing note—will not be seen as
condemnatory, regardless of whether most individuals favor or disfavor the coin, or are
simply ambivalent about it. Payment systems are usually just not the sort of stuff that
gives rise to moral posturing. The refusal to condemn is what produces Kahan’s selfreinforcing wave of resistance. When the possibility of condemnation disappears, so
does the risk of a “self-enforcing wave of resistance” that bolsters the very norm the
government is seeking to change.144 Because there is no condemnation in the context of
payments hard shoves are more effective than gentle nudges.
2. Three Illustrations
Three examples, two historical and the other contemporary, help illustrate the
point. The historical examples stem from the need to finance the Civil War and require a
bit of exposition. The contemporary example is the adoption of the euro, a story with
which most readers will be somewhat familiar. Taken together, these examples not only
show the effectiveness of hard shoves, but also demonstrate that “hard shove” is not
synonymous with “the most heavy-handed measure possible.” The examples also
demonstrate that while governments do not have to worry about preference backlash
when they are not engaging in condemnation, they are nonetheless restrained by political
consequences.
144
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We begin with demand notes and the legal tender provision. Prior to the Civil
War, the federal government conducted its business in specie, i.e., through the use of
coined money. As the cost of the Civil War began to vastly exceed projections, the
United States borrowed through demand notes to help close the gap between revenue and
expenditures. These demand notes did not bear interest and were paid to government
employees and suppliers in lieu of coin. As their name suggests, the notes initially
entitled the bearer to obtain specie from the Treasury upon demand. In 1862, however,
Congress issued demand notes that were redeemable in interest-bearing bonds, not in
specie. Congress further specified that these demand notes (colloquially known as
greenbacks) were “lawful money and a legal tender in payment of all debts, public and
private, within the United States.”145 This was, of course, the predecessor to our present
legal tender statute.
Because the legal tender provision required government creditors to accept
demand notes, its potential consequences were profound. If legal tender is competitively
priced in the marketplace, the receiver should be largely indifferent between accepting
the tender or another market equivalent. If the receiver prefers a different form of
payment, such as specie, she can simply exchange what was tendered, with little loss of
value.146 But if the tender is artificially set above its market value, the creditor has gotten
less than the market equivalent in other goods or monies. The creditor thus will prefer
some other form of payment over the legal tender.147
This is precisely what unfolded during the inflationary period of the Civil War.
Gold quickly rose to a premium against greenbacks, at one point reaching a high of 185
percent.148 Creditors who were owed a $100 debt would have preferred $100 in coin, or
at least the amount of greenbacks that equaled the gold value of the debt.149 Legal tender
provisions, however, prevented the creditor from acting on this preference; instead, the
creditor simply had to accept $100 worth of greenbacks in satisfaction of the debt.
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The legal tender provision was a particularly hard shove and was (and still is) of
questionable constitutionality.150 What is most relevant for our purposes, however, is
how the legal tender provision eliminated the complications of network effects. In our
discussion of the Susan B. Anthony, we suggested that the coin failed because: (a) the
government lacked profit opportunities that would have allowed it to subsidize either
consumer or merchant use, and (b) the coin did not offer greater benefits for consumers
and merchants, such that they would opt for the coin in the absence of such subsidies.
Similarly, demand notes were markedly less beneficial than specie from the creditor’s
perspective, and any subsidy flowed from the creditor to the government, not the other
way around. Compared to demand notes, then, the Susan B. Anthony was the greatest
thing in monetary policy since the demise of the fei.151 But because the government used
the hard shove of the legal tender provision, creditors had to accept them.
The 10 percent tax on state bank notes was another hard shove that stemmed from
the government’s effort to finance the Civil War. After the charter of the second Bank of
the United States expired in 1836, the federal government temporarily withdrew from
supervising the nation’s banking.152 Banks created under state law flourished. By 1861,
more than 1600 of these banks existed, and, until the issuance of demand notes, state
notes functioned as the nation’s only non-coin currency. Many of the notes traded at a
discount from face value, depending on public confidence in the issuing bank and the
distance from the community in which the notes had been issued.153 The sheer number of
notes and the confusion over their value created conditions that were ripe for
counterfeiting, and thus fraudulent notes circulated as well.154 As one historian has
described, “As far as paper money was concerned, the chaos was almost
indescribable.”155
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The National Bank Act of 1863 (as amended in 1864 and 1865) changed all this.
The Act authorized nationally chartered banks, which were permitted to issue a new form
of paper currency known as the National Bank Note. These new national banks were
subject to much stricter regulation than their state bank competitors. The national banks
had to satisfy minimum capital requirements, to refrain from making speculative loans,
and to back up deposits with specified reserve amounts. In addition, banks that issued
National Bank Notes had to own at least an equal amount of United States government
securities.156 These regulations placed the nationally-chartered banks at a serious
competitive disadvantage with the state banks.157 Congress countered this competitive
threat by placing a 10 percent tax on the issuance of state bank notes, which were the
state banks’ primary source of income. The 10 percent tax made the issuance of state
notes “virtually prohibitive,”158 and state bank notes quickly disappeared from
circulation. Without this source of income, the number of state banks dropped to fewer
than 250 by 1868.159 The traditional story of the 10 percent tax, then, is that it drove out
chaotic and unregulated state currency, and that it helped create a market for United
States bonds, which were necessary to finance the Civil War.160
In terms of its effect on payment forms, the 10 percent tax effectively eliminated
the state bank alternative to the national notes. But it may not have been the most heavyhanded means available to Congress. In Veazie Bank v. Fenno,161 a Maine bank
challenged the 10 percent tax. Although the bulk of the Supreme Court’s opinion
addressed arguments about whether the tax was direct (which would have required it to
be laid in proportion to the Census), Veazie Bank also contended that the tax was
unconstitutional because its purpose was to altogether prevent state banks from issuing
notes .162 The Court disposed of this argument by stating that it was irrelevant whether
the tax was an indirect attempt to outlaw state notes because Congress had the power to
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directly prohibit the notes.163 As one constitutional scholar has described, on this point
Veazie is “more than a little glib and was certainly generous in its interpretation of
congressional power.”164
But if, in fact, Congress had the authority to directly outlaw the notes and
perceived itself as having this authority, the 10 percent tax emphasizes an important
point: when we suggest that the government use hard shoves to ensure the success of a
payment form, we do not mean that the government should use the hardest possible
shove. Instead, the government should do only what is necessary to make a particular
payment system prevail. There is usually good reason to use the lightest touch possible,
either because the government may be concerned about exceeding its authority, or
because it is often politically astute to appear to be doing something less than
steamrolling over constituent preferences.
This point may have particular relevance for the 10 percent tax. At least one
scholar has questioned the traditional account of Congressional motives and argued that
the state banking system was considerably sounder than the traditional account admits.
As George Selgin points out, if state bank notes were clearly inferior to national bank
notes, then no tax should have been necessary to drive them out of existence; rather,
consumers should have adopted national bank notes even in the absence of a prohibitive
tax.165 Selgin posits that the tax drove out state bank notes “that were considered just as
good for most purposes as their national counterparts.”166 If Selgin’s historical account is
accurate, then the 10 percent tax did not simply cement a system that consumers were
inclined to favor; rather, it forced consumers to use national bank notes instead of the
state alternative.
In any event, the combined effect of legal tender provision and the 10 percent tax
was transformative. Prior to the Civil War, the nation had two forms of currency: coin
and state bank notes. By the War’s end, the nation had three sources of currency: coin,
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demand notes, and national bank notes. Indeed, it is not hyperbole to say that the
monetary hard shoves of the Civil War period created the governmental role of fiduciary
as described in this paper, which largely contemplates the government acting to protect or
replace its paper money.167 People may have preferred hard money during the Civil War
era, but that preference was effectively steamrolled. When the government makes a
strong shove for a particular payment system, the shove tends to stick, at least as long as
the government itself sticks. This is a point we return to after our discussion of the euro.
To be fair, the European Union and the 12 member countries that launched the
euro had worked hard to avoid the necessity of a shove.168 The euro was a long time
coming. As early as 1957, the Treaty of Rome declared that Europe would strive for a
common European market. The Single European Act (1986) and the Treaty of the
European Union (1992) built on this objective by introducing the Economic and
Monetary Union, which provided the foundation for a single currency. In 1995, the
European Council coined the name “euro.”169 In 1999, the exchange rate for each
national currency was set and the euro was officially launched, but it operated without
any tangible manifestation. For three years, each country continued to use its own notes
and coins, although European stock exchanges and banks were required to use euros for
all non-cash transactions.170 Euros, for this period, were exclusively digital.
Then came the hard shove. On January 1, 2002, euro bank notes and coins began
to circulate. With the exception of Germany, each country allowed a brief interlude
(typically two months) during which both euros and national currency were legal tender.
But at the end of the dual circulation period, national notes and coins were no longer
legal tender, although they could still be redeemed for euros. Citizens in the 12 member
countries could no longer avoid the euro, regardless of their preferences.
These preferences were and are decidedly mixed and, in some countries,
markedly negative. The European Commission has monitored public opinion about the
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euro since March 2000. Although the questions vary a bit from survey to survey, the
Commission’s work provides a continuing snapshot of the euro’s reception. The upshot
of this polling data, excerpted below, is that significant numbers of citizens across the 12
member countries would have preferred not to have the euro in the first instance,171 and
that more than four years of life with the euro seems to have not dramatically affected
attitudes toward it.
* Just five weeks before the launch of euro banknotes and coins, 48% of people
polled in the 12 member countries thought the euro “will mean more advantages
than disadvantages [to them] personally,” while 40% expected more personal
disadvantages. In Germany, the country most hostile toward the euro, 41%
expected more personal advantages, while 51% expected more disadvantages.172
* One year after the launch of euro banknotes and coins, 50% of the people polled
in the 12 member countries described themselves as happy that the euro had
become their country’s currency; 39% as unhappy, and 11% as neither happy nor
unhappy. In Germany, 28% described themselves as happy; 68% as unhappy, and
4% as neither happy nor unhappy.173 In a related measure, 54% of the people
polled in the 12 member countries described themselves as believing the adoption
of the euro was “advantageous overall” and would “strengthen their country for
the future,” whereas 32% described the adoption as disadvantageous, and 7%
perceived no change. In Germany, 39% believed euro adoption was
advantageous for their country overall; 52% believed adoption was
disadvantageous, and 4% perceived no change.174
* Two years after the launch, 47% of the people polled in the 12 member
countries described themselves as happy that the euro had become their currency;
44% described themselves as unhappy, and 9% were neither happy nor unhappy.
In Germany, 30% described themselves as happy; 67% described themselves as
unhappy, and 2% described themselves as neither happy nor unhappy.175 In
another measure, 52% of the people polled in the 12 member countries described
the adoption of the euro as advantageous overall for their country; 36% described
it as disadvantageous overall, and 5% perceived no change. In Germany, 42%
believed adoption was advantageous; 52% believed it was disadvantageous, and
2% perceived no change.176
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* Three years after the launch, 53% of the people polled in the 12 member
countries described adoption of the euro as advantageous overall for their country;
36% described it as disadvantageous, and 5% perceived no change.177 In
Germany, 41% found adoption advantageous for their country; 50% found it
disadvantageous, and 5% perceived no change.178
* Four years after the launch, 51% of the people polled in the 12 member
countries recognized adoption of the euro as advantageous for their country
overall; 39% as disadvantageous, and 6% perceived no change.179 In Germany,
47% perceived adoption as advantageous for their country; 48% perceived it to be
disadvantageous, and 39% perceived no change.180
Indeed, what is particularly striking is how post-euro preferences remain largely
unchanged. But while the story of the euro is still unfolding, no one expects that these
preferences will create a backlash that will resurrect national currencies, even in countries
like Germany.
This is not to say, of course, that the adoption of the euro has not had political
consequences. Former German chancellor Helmut Kohl, for instance, writes in his
memoir that he forced the euro on the German people against their will and that they
voted him out of office because of it.181 As other example, many commentators believe
that the Netherlands recently voted to reject the European Constitution because of
widespread dissatisfaction with the euro.
This emphasizes another larger point: in contexts where the government action
invokes condemnation, the backlash predicted by social norm theory is one potential
restraint on governmental action. No government wants to end up reinforcing the very
action it sought to discourage or making the behavior it was trying to promote even less
preferred. But just because a government that legislates or makes policy decisions about
payment systems does not have to worry about preference backlash, it nonetheless has to
concern itself with political consequences. This is the perfectly obvious observation that
politicians are held accountable by their constituents. As such, governments engaging in
hard shoves have the heavy burden of demonstrating that the promoted payment system
genuinely benefits either the country as a whole or significant numbers of its citizens, or
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that the payment system is necessary to serve some larger purpose. The architects of the
legal tender provision, for example, may have perceived it as necessary to preserve the
solvency of big commercial banks, which would in turn allow for the sale of government
bonds, which would in turn finance the Civil War.182 The European governments that
adopted the euro believed that a common currency would result in economic strength; in
time, their citizens will learn whether these governments were right.
To connect back to a discussion earlier in the paper, if the United States
government really wants Americans to adopt a dollar coin, then it should proceed with
the hard shove of withdrawing the competing paper note. This would have two
advantages. First, this is the mechanism most likely to result in success. Second, and just
as important, this route has the benefit of clarity. In replacing the dollar bill, the
government will have the burden of demonstrating that the switch benefits the economy
as a whole.183

Part V. Government Action and the Future of American Payment Systems
Payment methods are poised to continue the massive evolution that has occurred
over the past twenty-five years. For instance, payments vendors are increasingly
pushing various smart card systems. Building on the success of SpeedPass (the
ExxonMobil system which allows drivers to purchase gas at the pump with the wave of a
smart card), both Visa and Mastercard are involved in projects to allow for so-called
“contactless” payments. As we noted in the Introduction, cellular phones may also soon
become “digital wallets” that can pay for purchases, check balances, pay bills, and
transfer funds.184 Finally, at least one government has begun to discuss whether it should
issue electronic money.185
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Advocates of these new systems are increasingly likely to attempt to involve
government in promoting their new payment mechanisms. As Part IV illustrated, the
federal government has a number of tools at its disposal that can promote the adoption of
a payment system. Because vendors will have made large investments in these systems,
they have powerful incentives to call upon the government to aid them. In this final Part,
we suggest that such government intervention is often unwise, for three reasons. First,
technology moves quickly and the government (usually) moves slowly As such, by the
time the government intervenes, the “new” payment method it seeks to support might
already be on its way out. Second, with a bit of time, new payment systems that are
sufficiently advantageous to the consumer are likely to flourish and thus governmental
intervention is ultimately unnecessary. Third, such intervention may have the unintended
consequence of undermining the incentive to invest in new payment technologies in the
first instance. The next Part discusses the first two possibilities in the contexts of Check
21 and the evolution of electronic giros in two European countries. We then illustrate the
third possibility by describing in a little more detail where the payments industry is likely
to go over the next decade (always a dangerous task) and what actions industry players
may call upon Congress to take. We then conclude with a few thoughts on electronic
currency, which is perhaps the most radical emerging payment system.
A.

Check 21

As we described in the Introduction, Check 21 was designed to facilitate the
exchange of electronic checks between banks. But, as a legal matter, no law was
necessary to achieve this result. Prior to the passage of Check 21, no statute said that
banks had to present paper checks to other banks for collection. Even in the wake of
Check 21, the law is silent on the form of technology used to exchange checks. All
Check 21 provides is that banks can no longer require that the original check be returned
to them; instead, they have to accept some sort of electronic substitute.

The legislation

was aimed at remedying a variant on the classic network effects problem. Banks would
not invest in the technology to allow electronic truncation because an insufficiently large
number of other banks had adopted the technology. Presumably, given the billions of
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dollars that electronic truncation was expected to save the banking industry, the
technology should have eventually caught on. But there was one additional
complication: consumers who like receiving back their original checks.186 While banks,
left to themselves, might have quickly migrated to electronic truncation, some banks were
concerned they would lose customers if they, but not their competitors, switched to
electronic truncation. The problem was thus that the entrenched preferences of some
consumers gave banks little incentive to move to the new system, even though it
promised large savings. Furthermore, at least at the time that Check 21 passed, no
intermediary had emerged to internalize the switching costs.
Into this quagmire came Congress. In Check 21, the national legislature solved
the problem of consumer preferences by applying what amounted to a hard shove. No
matter where a consumer banked, she could not be guaranteed the return of her original
checks, because her bank could not insist upon the return of the original from other
financial institutions. In addition, through the use of the legend we discussed in the
Introduction, Congress attempted to educate consumers about the legal status of
electronic checks and their printouts. But the key was the hard shove.
What is complicated about this story is that the hard shove does not appear either
necessary or successful. Even without Check 21, a significant percentage of check
payments were likely to migrate to electronic payments as a result of accounts receivable
check conversion (“ARC”). In the ARC process, a creditor takes a check written by a
consumer to pay a bill and uses that check as an authorization to initiate an electronic
direct debit from the consumer’s account (in other words, a payment flowing in the
opposite direction of a direct deposit). Consumers are given some form of notice that the
company will be engaging in the practice and the opportunity to opt-out, but very few
do.187 In 2004, more than a billion checks were converted to ARC payments,188 and in
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2005, the amount was over 1.6 billion.189 In addition, another 160 million checks were
converted to electronic payments at the point of sale in what are known as POP
transactions. In these, the consumer presents a check to a merchant, who then uses the
check to initiate a direct debit from the consumer’s checking account (using the bank
routing number and the account number found on the bottom line of the check), and then
returns the check to the consumer as a receipt.190 Given the explosive growth in such
alternatives to check truncation, it is far from clear that Check 21 was necessary.
In fact, to date, the scant evidence suggests that Check 21 has been particularly
unsuccessful.

For instance, in a Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City publication in

April 2005, the authors conceded that widespread electronic clearing of checks had not
yet occurred and that, under existing conditions, electronic truncation was more
expensive than paper check processing.191 Another report by the Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago suggested that, nine months after passage, only 1% of the checks processed by
the Federal Reserve Banks were substitute checks.192 Assuming this number is correct,
only about 130 million checks were converted. That number obviously pales in
comparison to the number of ARC transactions. To date, it seems that Congressional
efforts to push electronic truncation have failed. Alternative technologies have emerged
that make electronic truncation far less important than banks had predicted.193
189
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In this particular case, the failure of the hard shove seems costless because there
has been little political backlash, either in the aftermath of the legislation’s passage or in
the face of its apparent ineffectiveness. But the Check 21 saga illustrates that in applying
hard shoves on behalf of industry, the government risks political backlash in situations
where the results are uncertain. When the European Union mandates the euro, or the
Canadian government mandates the loon, they can be pretty sure that they will succeed.
But when the government seeks to get involved in promoting private payment networks,
the outcomes are far less certain, which should caution against government entanglement.
B.

Electronic Giros

In our Check 21 example, substitute checks became less relevant in the wake of
ARC technology. Another possibility is that the technology the government seeks to
promote will remain important, so much so that it will eventually take off on its own,
without governmental intervention. An example from Europe helps illustrates this point.
Getting consumers and merchants to switch from paper-based transactions, such
as checks or giros,194 to electronic payments over networks results in significant social
economic benefits.195 As such, a switch to electronic payments is to a country’s
economic advantage. In addition, we can assume that most merchants prefer electronic
payment systems because they receive their money more quickly. But European
countries vary widely in the extent to which electronic payments are made. For instance,
in the Netherlands, the vast majority of non-cash payments are made by electronic “credit
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transfers” (essentially electronic giro payments).196 Such payments are rarer in Greece197
and Portugal.198 Instead, Greeks have continued to use checks and paper-based giros for
the vast bulk of payments, and have adopted credit cards in large numbers for small-value
transactions. In Portugal, the data suggests that checks, but not paper-based giros,
compete with electronic giros for payments. These national differences are no doubt the
result of both historical patterns of making payments as well as the price structure of
various payment forms.
With regard to the price structure of payments, the story is one with which a
reader should be very familiar: banks expect that consumers will respond to price
incentives; that is, banks anticipate that consumers will use electronic alternatives if they
are cheaper than the paper equivalent. But consumers rarely pay directly for such
services; instead they pay indirectly, through the loss of the “float” on paper checks or
through lower interest on account balances. No bank wants to be the first (and possibly
only) institution to start directly charging customers for services they had perceived as
free.199 Again, the issue is a variant of the classic network effects problem. So how can
one country make the switch more quickly than the other?
Between 1990 and 2004, Norway and the Netherlands experienced significant
changes in the way that consumers paid for point-of-sale transactions.200 Electronic
payments, however, took off more quickly in Norway than in the Netherlands. This is
because, in Norway, customers were charged a per-transaction fee for their use of both
electronic and paper payment systems, with the electronic generally cheaper.201
Norwegian banks were able to overcome the risk of losing customers by coordinating the
timing of when per-transaction fees would begin.202 While ordinarily, this sort of
collusion would draw the attention of antitrust officials,203 they did nothing to prevent it.
Per-transaction fees were also encouraged by Norway’s central bank. Not surprisingly,
196
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Norwegian consumers reacted to the price incentive by moving away from the old system
to the new.
But while change did not happen quite as rapidly in the Netherlands as in
Norway, it still occurred. In other words, even without a price incentive and the
coordination that made the incentive possible, Dutch consumers eventually adopted the
new payment systems. For instance, per person use of electronic giro payments in
Norway grew 12% annually between 1990 and 2004; per person use of electronic giro
payments grew 7% annually in the Netherlands during the same time period.204 But in
both countries, paper checks had almost entirely disappeared by 2004. Dutch and
Norwegian consumers had replaced them with electronic giros payments, debit cards, and
cash that was usually withdrawn through an ATM.205
A comparison of Norway and the Netherlands, then, suggests that sometimes the
payment technology the government seeks to promote would have taken off without any
legislative push, particularly if the technology is sufficiently advantageous to consumers
and merchants. In these situations, the government bears the risk of political backlash, all
for legislation that offers no genuine long-term benefit. And even in the absence of
political backlash, legislating is costly. If the legislation prompts no change beyond what
the market would have accomplished in its own time, then legislative resources are better
spent elsewhere. Again, this cautions against government entanglement in private
payment systems.
C.

The Future of Payment Systems

Although predicting what is on the horizon of payment systems is a tricky
endeavor, we are confident about what payment providers would like to see: an increase
in the use of smart card transactions, which may also lead to more use of stored value
card networks. Of course, to date, the American market has remained resistant and
perhaps even hostile to both technologies. We have already noted the spectacular failure
of the Upper West Side experiment with stored value cards in the late 1990s.206 Most
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other trials in the United States have failed as well, even though smart cards and stored
value cards have been successful in other parts of the world.207 Analysts have attributed
this to the United States’ advanced telecommunications system, which ensures that debit
and credit card transactions can be verified quickly and cheaply.208 This infrastructure
results in “relatively low fraud levels and relatively high levels of satisfaction among
businesses and consumers within the current system.”209 As we have previously
suggested, in order for an alternative payment option to succeed, some subset of
transactions must exist in which the consumer will be better off if she uses the alternative
option. For the most part, only United States consumers who are essentially required to
use a smart or stored value cards (such as those consumers in transportation systems or
on military bases,) have found these payment options beneficial.210
At present, it is difficult for us to see what benefits smart card technology will
offer American consumers in retail transactions, at least in the near future. At present,
speed appears to be the primary advantage of the technology: it does not require the entry
of a pin number or a signature. For example, ExxonMobil’s Speedpass allows drivers to
purchase gasoline by waving the wand of the Speedpass in front of a reader. Chase
Bank’s Mastercard system similarly enables consumers to make small payments with a
wave of a card. More radically, cell phone manufacturers have begun to experiment with
similar service through their phones, a system that has already taken hold in some parts of
Asia. But it is unclear whether speed is enough of an advantage to attract a critical mass
of consumers. In addition, because of the recent trend among some merchants to forego a
signature for small credit or debit transactions,211 speed is suddenly not unique to smart
card technology.
Of course, some recent developments may benefit smart and stored value cards.
First, some consumers are becoming more familiar with these payment options, either
because they utilize transportation systems in major cities, or because they have been
207
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involved with a university that sponsors a smart or stored value card,212 or because they
have seen advertising by companies like Chase and ExxonMobil. In addition, increasing
numbers of merchants are unwilling to accept checks for retail transactions.213 The
decline of the check may leave room for a new payment system, perhaps one that will
appeal to consumers who have previously eschewed credit and debit cards. It is not clear
to us, however, that smart or stored value cards can capitalize on this market niche.
At the same time, however, as payment providers invest resources in smart and
stored value card options, there will be tremendous pressure for them to succeed.
Of course, the key to any new smart card or stored value card technology will be
ensuring sufficient use by both consumers and merchants. How precisely coordination of
the demand by both sides can be achieved is not clear – if we knew, we would not be
writing law review articles! But what does seem certain is that the competitive pressure
to use these technologies, particularly smart card technology, is only likely to increase in
coming years.214 Against this background, it would be surprising if industry did not
attempt to enlist government support for its new technologies. As we have explained, our
view is that, in general, the federal government should resist such entreaties.
Industries’ most likely request is that government require operators of new
payment systems to increase interoperability. For example, consider the market for
payments by cell phone. Interoperability issues could arise at two different levels. First,
different cell phone companies may develop different technologies, with the result that
only some cell phones will work in one location to make a payment, while other cell
phones will work in another location. Second, cell phone companies may differ in what
212
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payment services they are willing to offer to customers. One company might allow its
customers to select among accounts from which to make payments, while another
company may require that customers only make payments through a credit card, perhaps
even a particular bank’s credit card.
Just as the Federal Reserve and banking interests sought congressional aid in
mandating the acceptance of substitute checks, payments industry parties may seek
assistance in gaining acceptance of a particular cell phone technology. In Hong Kong,
for instance, nearly 95 percent carry the Octopus card, which is a stored value card that
(like E-ZPass) uses RFID technology.215 One of the main factors in the Octopus card’s
phenomenal success was the formation of a joint venture by the five largest public
transportation providers to support the creation of a card that would work on all of their
lines.216 Similarly, the success of smart cards in Europe has been tied to the willingness
of state telephone companies to mandate their adoption for pay phones.217 For cell phone
payment schemes to work in the United States, interoperability is also likely to be crucial;
only interoperability will allow sufficient benefits to satisfy the heterogeneous
preferences of a critical mass of consumers, which will in turn induce merchants to
accept cell phone payments.
One quick means of increasing the possibility of a critical mass is for the
government to mandate a particular technology.218 Such a move would, of course, limit
consumer choice among possible products. For instance, Cingular is testing a product in
Atlanta that uses special RFID chips in cell phone handset covers to allow customers to
make payments at Philips Arena.219 In this product, the chip connects the cell phone with
the customer’s “exiting Chase credit card accounts.”220 An alternative product is
Obopay, which provides consumers with software that allows them to receive and make
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various payments via their phone.221 In the Obopay system, the phone itself is not used to
make retail payments; instead, the consumer uses a special debit card that is linked to the
Obopay account.222 One possibility is that smaller existing payment providers will
pressure the government to ensure that these new services provide access to not just
particular accounts, but to all of a consumer’s credit and/or deposit accounts.223 On its
face, such governmental intervention is appealing, for it would make such products
attractive to a wider variety of consumers and thereby increase the likelihood of adoption.
The rub is that the success of such systems is likely to require not just attractive services,
but also the use of incentives.224 For example, Obopay presently gives new users $10 in
their account just for signing up. Incentives are costs, and those costs need to be
internalized by someone. The most likely parties are existing payment providers. And if
those providers are not guaranteed exclusive access to customers, they may fail to invest
in the first place. In this context, then, government interference, far from increasing
consumer choice, may actually undermine it.
Stored value cards present a similar problem. Notwithstanding the success of
Octopus in Hong Kong, stored value cards have usually failed in the United States,225 and
have had mixed results in Europe.226 Nonetheless, moving from cash transactions to
electronic transactions promises significant savings for the United States economy,227 so
the interest in pushing this technology will remain.228 One intriguing possibility, which is
currently under discussion in Singapore, is for the federal government itself to actually
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issue electronic money.229 A more radical possibility would be for the government to
make electronic currency (rather than coins and notes) legal tender or to even abolish
coins and notes altogether.230 Any of these actions would necessitate the use of stored
value cards; the stored value card would provide a means for the consumer to present her
money to the merchant during point-of-sale transactions.
We will start with the most extreme option – replacing coins and notes with
electronic currency. In this scenario, the government would be mandating the switch to a
cashless society. Assuming such a decision was constitutional,231 this hard shove would
no doubt succeed, but would also be unwise. As we saw with the euro, overriding some
consumers’ preferences for preexisting cash systems can create short-term (and perhaps
long-term) political backlashes that frustrate other governmental objectives (and thus
provide a cost that may outweigh the benefits of change). A mandatory switch to a
cashless society in the United States would likely be accompanied by even greater
negative political consequences, particularly in light of the threat to privacy and the
possibility that some consumers who could not master electronic currency technology
might be pushed into the underground economy.232 As a result, such a move is not only
unwise, it is unlikely to even occur in the foreseeable future.
A slightly less radical option, however, is for the government to make electronic
currency legal tender. That is, the government could simply mandate that electronic
currency, like coins and notes, has to be accepted for all debts. This would also amount
to a hard shove, although not nearly as hard as altogether abolishing coins and notes. But
so long as it was clear that merchants need not accept electronic currency in point-of-sale
transactions, the shove might well fail. As the examples of the dollar coins and twodollar bill illustrated, just because a payment form is legal tender does not mean that a
critical mass of consumers will start to use it. In the absence of demonstrably greater
benefits for both consumers and merchants, many people may simply choose not to adopt
electronic currency and the stored values cards that would accompany it.
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An even gentler approach would be for the government to indicate that it would
accept electronic currency for all debts (most prominently, of course, for tax payments).
This would amount to an incentive for consumers to use the system. As with a legal
tender statute, however, the problem with both this possibility (and the even gentler one,
that is, that the government simply issue electronic money) is that it is by no means clear
that the governmental intervention would work. Certainly, government willingness to
issue electronic currency payments and to receive them would give both consumers and
merchants a further incentive to adopt stored value card systems. But as we have noted,
the adoption and use decisions are separate. It is far from clear that in either case, the
government actions would be enough to get consumers to use electronic currency on a
day-to-day basis, particularly if it remains relatively easy to convert electronic currency
into coins or notes.233
Moreover, the stronger the governmental shove towards stored value cards, the
greater the risk that the government will stifle competition in the electronic payments
industry. Because stored value cards are currently not a necessity, there is competitive
pressure for payment providers to entice consumers and merchants with special
incentives and services. Payment providers also have an incentive to continue to develop
new technologies that expand the appeal of their products. Any governmental action that
forces stored value cards upon consumers and merchants is likely to cut off these sorts of
innovations and incentives because they will no longer be necessary to ensure widespread
use of stored value cards. The potential for stifling competition in the payments industry,
then, is another reason why government should rarely intervene in the private payments
industry.
Conclusion
Close your wallets. As we have discussed, whatever payment options you found
inside it are the result of both platform economics and incremental changes in payment
233
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technologies over the course of the last 50 years. The government has the ability to
influence these platform economics, either with gentle measures or with strong ones.
But although the government does not have to worry that its attempts to influence
consumer and merchant preferences will end up reinforcing the very payment options it is
seeking to replace, it nonetheless must exercise caution. Not only do politicians have to
worry about political backlash, but such intervention may have consequences that the
government cannot foresee. By the time the government acts, the “new” payment
method it seeks to support might already be on its way towards obsolescence, the
payment alternative may be capable of flourishing without governmental intervention, or
the intervention might stifle competition in the payments industry. Nonetheless, as
payment providers strive to put their products in your wallet, they are likely to ask the
government for help when they believe it is necessary.
One thing is certain. When our children open their wallets 50 years from now,
they are likely to find payment alternatives that are very different from the ones we use
today. But the explanation for why our children use these payment methods is likely to
be the same as the one offered in this paper. No payment alternative will succeed unless
it can attract adequate users on both sides of the platform. What will be interesting is
which emergent payment systems follow the upwards trajectory of credit and debit cards,
and which go the way of the two-dollar bill.

______
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